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INTRODUCTION 
Why do we have trade secrets?  This was the fifty billion1 dollar 
question I was asking myself in a trade secrets trial as the judge asked, 
“I assume that you’ll have evidence of irreparable injury to obtain an 
injunction if the jury finds trade secret misappropriation?”2  I must 
admit that I was surprised by the question.  After all, what good are 
trade secrets if the owner cannot easily stop someone from using them?  
If someone steals source code, then an injunction issues as a matter of 
course, does it not?3  Why should trade secrets not be treated like any 
other property?  The answers to these questions are unclear, and, in 
general, case law simply does not provide a compelling answer to the 
question of why we should have trade secrets and whether or not trade 
secrets should be entitled to the same treatment as other forms of real, 
personal, and intellectual property. 
Trade secrets are curious anomalies in intellectual property law.  
They are arguably the most important and most litigated form of 
intellectual property,4 yet they have recently been called “parasitic”5 and 
the leading economic analysis claims that “there is no law of trade 
secrets.”6  The basis for these claims is that trade secret 
misappropriation relies for the most part on wrongdoing that is 
independent of any “trade secret law,” relying instead, for example, on a 
breach of contract or trespass claim. 
“Why,” the detractors ask, “do we need separate trade secret laws 
when common law principles will suffice?”  In a well considered and 
clearly written analysis, Professor Robert Bone concludes that, on the 
 
 1. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & ASIS FOUND., 
TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS:  SURVEY REPORT 1 (2002), http://www.asis 
online.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf (suggesting that proprietary information and 
intellectual property losses exceeded $53 billion in a single year); see also Josh Lerner, The 
Importance of Trade Secrecy:  Evidence from Civil Litigation (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 95-043, 1994). 
 2. Traditionally, injunctions are only granted as a matter of equity, and irreparable 
harm must be shown.  Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992). 
 3. This question does not address preliminary injunctions for which the standard 
equitable principles undoubtedly apply.  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 
541–42 (1987).  Instead, this is a question solely relating to permanent injunctions issued after 
trial. 
 4. Lerner, supra note 1. 
 5. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:  Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998). 
 6. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 355 (2003); see also David D. Friedman et al., Some 
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 62 (1991). 
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whole, trade secrets lack normative justification and should be pared 
back.7  Professor Bone’s article has been cited in more than sixty journal 
articles since it was written in 1998, and only two authors have since 
challenged it by attempting to provide a normative justification for trade 
secret laws.8  Even authors claiming to justify trade secrets assert that 
“United States trade secret law is in a state of disarray.”9 
This Article examines four potential ways to justify trade secret law.  
First, it considers property rights and proposes a different way to look at 
whether trade secrets are property.  It concludes that further 
examination of the underlying bundle of rights is necessary for 
normative justification. 
It then provides and responds to criticism of three other 
independent normative justifications for trade secret law’s bundle of 
rights:  economic justifications, philosophical justifications, and populist 
justifications.  Contrary to other areas of intellectual property law, none 
of these include an incentive to innovate as a primary feature; instead, 
the Article expands on prior economic analysis that justifies trade 
secrets by examining the marginal benefits of the law, answering 
criticism of past detractors, and considering remedies provided by the 
law. 
 
 7. Bone, supra note 5, at 296–303. 
 8. Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian?  A 
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 69 (1999).  
Professor Chiappetta separates misappropriation into three parts:  misuse of voluntary 
disclosures, torts that threaten public order, and other improper means.  While his analysis of 
each of these types of misappropriation is helpful for understanding the particular type of 
misappropriation, I believe that these categories overlap too much to allow for distinctions in 
many cases, and such distinctions were not made when the law was created.  Thus, I attempt 
to set out a more unified approach in this Article when seeking a justification for trade 
secrets.  See also James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of 
Obligations, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1999) (arguing that unjust enrichment justifies trade secret 
law).  The unjust enrichment theory he presents is quite similar to utilitarian strains of the 
Lockean theory described in this Article.  While Professor Hill provides a general 
justification for protecting trade secrets, he does not address in detail the social costs and 
benefits associated with the specific trade secret laws in place. 
 9. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 69; see also Bone, supra note 5, at 304 (“Trade secret law 
is in a muddle today.”).  While its detractors may believe that trade secret law overprotects 
information or lacks predictive value on the margins, it cannot be said that the basic set of 
rules is in flux, though there are state-by-state contradictions, some of which are discussed 
below.  However, most might agree that the state of justification for trade secrets is in 
disarray.  See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 13 (Cal. 2003) (including a 
description by the California Supreme Court of just about every known justification for trade 
secret law with very little analysis). 
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The current law of trade secrecy grew out of a need to hold third 
parties liable for misuse of information despite a lack of privity with the 
owner.  This led to an early definition of trade secrets as property.10  
Over time, the law shifted to a theory of unfair competition.11  This 
changing theory, however, did not modify the underlying nature of trade 
secrets, and with the passage of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA), trade secrets are now addressed under a widespread statutory 
regime,12 although the debate about whether trade secrets are property 
continues. 
None of this history provides a normative basis for the law.  Instead, 
we must look to the underlying reasons why this particular type of 
information is protected because it is so different from its most 
analogous forms of intellectual property—patents and copyrights. 
In a sense, the title of this Article is a misnomer; we have trade 
secrets now because either the courts or state legislatures thought they 
might be a good idea.  The real question is rather whether they really 
are a good idea.  I believe they are; trade secret law is not merely a 
result of irrational and inefficient decision making.13  Instead, trade 
secrets are justified by the economic benefits that flow from their 
existence, most notably incentives for businesses to spend less money 
protecting secret information or attempting to appropriate secret 
information.  They are also justified under a Lockean “labor value” 
 
 10. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 12. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (Supp. 2006). 
 13. Professor Bone suggests that proponents of trade secret law have the “burden of 
persuasion” to justify the existence of trade secrets.  Bone, supra note 5, at 261.  If one 
believes that courts will promulgate efficient rules over time, then the opposite may be true.  
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 2.2 (4th ed. 1992); see also 
Michael Risch, How Can Whelan v. Jaslow and Lotus v. Borland Both Be Right?  
Reexamining the Economics of Computer Software Reuse, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 511, 523 (1999) (“The proposed economic model . . . is based on a theory that courts 
maximize the change in net social benefits in the cases before them” even if the courts do not 
know that they are doing so.).  Professor Bone responds that trade secret law is too new to 
presume that the common law is efficient, especially where the roots were in natural law and 
not subject to detailed policy and efficiency analysis.  Bone, supra note 5.  However, the 
courts, themselves, have seen thousands of trade secret cases and have had the best empirical 
evidence in front of them to make legal rules—the actual behavior in each case over a period 
of time.  Consideration of the long-term effect of these rules undoubtedly affected judicial 
analysis of trade secret law, even if not explicitly.  POSNER, supra, § 2.2 (“[T]he 
judge . . . cannot ignore the future.  Since the judge’s legal ruling will be a precedent 
influencing the decision of future cases, the judge must consider the probable impact of 
alternative rulings on future behavior . . . .”). 
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theory.  Finally, they are justified as a means for the public to enforce 
populist norms about “commercial ethics.” 
Part I of the Article discusses what trade secrets are and what 
benefits are afforded to owners of trade secrets.  As part of this 
discussion, Part I also briefly details the history of trade secret law and 
the changing justifications for it, including from property to unfair 
competition to statutory protection. 
Part II of the Article considers whether or not trade secrets are 
property and whether such a designation justifies trade secrets. 
Part III of the Article explores three reasons why trade secret law is 
desirable:  economics, philosophy, and populism. 
Part IV of the Article expands on the economic justification, 
detailing several areas where trade secret law is more efficient than the 
alternative, namely reliance solely on underlying law. 
An Appendix provides a numerical illustration of the economic 
justification for trade secret law as well as a breakdown of some 
mathematical formulas that are used in the analysis. 
I.  TRADE SECRETS AND THEIR HISTORY 
The history of trade secret law is an interesting study in how certain 
intellectual property rights have developed.  Whereas copyright and 
patent law in the United States find legal justification in the 
Constitution14 and implementing federal statutes, trade secret law grew 
out of the common law and has now been codified separately in most 
states.  Indeed, the very assumptions underlying patent and copyright 
laws—that government-granted rights can serve to incentivize the 
creation and sharing of new ideas and expression15—are diametrically 
opposed to the notion of keeping information secret to gain a 
competitive advantage. 
A.  Trade Secret Basics 
1.  Definition of a Trade Secret 
In broad strokes, a trade secret is some sort of information that has 
value because it is not generally known.  The notion of secrecy exempts 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 15. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).  While copyright law does not require sharing, the monetary 
incentive to create is greatest when works are shared with the public for profit. 
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trade secrets from preemption by patent law.16  The UTSA defines a 
trade secret as follows:17 
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, 
that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable18 by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
For those states that have not implemented the UTSA, and for most 
judicial opinions that predate the UTSA,19 the definition of a trade 
secret is set forth in the comment to section 757 of the Restatement 
(First) of Torts:20 
 Definition of trade secret.  A trade secret may consist of any 
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to 
 
 16. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491–92 (1974). 
 17. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
 18. Some states, most notably California, omit from the definition the requirement that 
the information not be readily ascertainable.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 1997).  Instead, 
that the information is “readily ascertainable” is a defense by the purported misappropriator, 
but only if the misappropriator actually “ascertained” the information in a legal way.  Sargent 
Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 287 (Ct. App. 2003); ABBA Rubber Co. v. 
Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 529 n.9 (Ct. App. 1991).  In California, one may not obtain 
information contrary to the statute and then claim that the information would have been 
readily ascertainable if only the defendant had acted properly. 
 19. The source of trade secret law will be discussed in detail below.  See infra Part I.B. 
 20. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).  The American Law Institute 
has since withdrawn this section from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in favor of its 
inclusion in the newer Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.  However, a few states 
(and federal and state agencies that deal with trade secrets) continue to use the Restatement 
(First) of Torts definition, while none appear to use the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition.  In any event, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines trade 
secrets as “information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and 
that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage 
over others.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).  While this 
definition differs from that of the UTSA, the comments to section 39 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition state that the section and definition are intended to track the 
definitions set forth in the UTSA.  Id. cmts. a–f.  It is unclear why a restatement of the law is 
necessary where a uniform statute covers the same materials, especially where the statute 
preempts any common law.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7.  Perhaps the intent is that non-
UTSA jurisdictions will follow a similar rule, though if that is the case, it is unclear why 
section 39 does not copy the UTSA definition exactly. 
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obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use 
it.21 
 Secrecy.  The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. 
Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an 
industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret.22 
The Restatement definition of a trade secret is different from that of 
the UTSA, but it is also similar.  Key differences are:  (a) the exception 
for “single use” information, which can be trade secret under the 
UTSA; (b) the requirement of continuous use in business, which is not 
required under the UTSA; and (c) less emphasis on efforts to maintain 
secrecy than under the UTSA. 
2.  Trade Secret Misappropriation 
Misappropriation of a trade secret involves improper means used to 
acquire or use a trade secret.23  Trade secret law outlaws three different 
 
 21. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.  The remainder of the portion about 
trade secrets, which is notably longer than the UTSA,  states: 
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating 
or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of 
customers.  It differs from other secret information in a business in that it is not 
simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business, 
as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the 
salary of certain employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or 
the date fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new 
model or the like.  A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the 
operation of the business.  Generally it relates to the production of goods, as, for 
example, a machine or formula for the production of an article.  It may, however, 
relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for 
determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a 
list of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office 
management. 
Id.  (citation omitted).  See section 759 of the Restatement (First) of Torts for a discussion 
distinguishing other secret information in a business. 
 22. The remainder of the portion about secrecy states: 
Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one markets cannot be 
his secret. . . . Nevertheless, a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, 
except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the 
information.  An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible.  Some factors to 
be considered in determining whether given information is one’s trade secret are:  
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the 
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the 
extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the 
value of the information to him and his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or 
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty 
with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 
Id.  
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acts:  (a) acquisition of a trade secret—merely obtaining the 
information; (b) disclosure of the trade secret—merely telling the 
information to another; and (c) use of the trade secret—using the 
information to one’s advantage. 
The categories of defendants who may be liable for 
misappropriation are also threefold:  (a) the knowing acquirer of 
information is liable—this person obtains the information by improper 
means; (b) the knowing discloser of information is liable—this person 
discloses the information that has been improperly acquired, or perhaps 
properly acquired but for which there is a duty of secrecy; and (c) the 
constructively improper acquirer/discloser of information is liable—this 
person obtains the information with reason to know that the 
information was improperly obtained.24 
 
 23. Under the UTSA, misappropriation is defined as: 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to 
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or 
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent 
by a person who 
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his 
knowledge of the trade secret was 
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to 
acquire it; 
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use; or 
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person 
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to 
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by 
accident or mistake. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2).  The Restatement (First) of Torts is very similar to the 
UTSA: 
One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is 
liable to the other if 
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or 
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by 
the other in disclosing the secret to him, or 
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was 
a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the 
third person’s disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or 
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its 
disclosure was made to him by mistake. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757. 
 24. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2).  Included in this category are those who 
learn that the information was obtained or disclosed by mistake but have not yet relied on the 
information at the time the mistake is discovered. 
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The discussion above uses the term “improper” extensively.  Under 
the UTSA, “‘improper means’ includes theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.”25  In 
large part, “improper means” includes acts that are actionable in and of 
themselves—trespass, breach of contract, conversion of physical 
property, and, under modern laws, the misuse of computer networks.26  
It is this reliance on common law wrongs that causes Bone to call trade 
secret law “parasitic”27 and Landes and Posner to declare that “there is 
no law of trade secrets.”28 
However, the list of particular improper means outlined by the 
UTSA is not all inclusive; it also includes a catchall for any sort of 
espionage.29  The rule is the same under the Restatement (First) of 
Torts.30  In fact, the Restatement makes it clear that some form of 
ethical standards determines improper means:  “A complete catalogue 
of improper means is not possible.  In general they are means which fall 
below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and 
reasonable conduct.”31 
It is up to the jury to determine improper means,32 but in most cases 
improper means will involve some other legally actionable wrong.  The 
most cited case to the contrary is E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. 
Christopher.33  In Christopher, the defendant took aerial photographs of 
a plant under construction.34  The Fifth Circuit ruled that although the 
photographs had not violated any law, the “espionage” was, 
nonetheless, an improper means of obtaining trade secrets.35  Landes 
 
 25. Id. § 1(1).  The Restatement (First) of Torts is similarly broad and vague.  
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f. 
 26. Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys., Inc., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1981 (E.D. Va. 
2003). 
 27. Bone, supra note 5, at 245. 
 28. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 355. 
 29. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1). 
 30. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (“But means may be improper under 
this rule even though they do not cause any other harm than that to the interest in the trade 
secret.  Examples of such means are fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure, 
tapping of telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage.”). 
 31. Id. 
 32. DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 33. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 34. Id. at 1013. 
 35. Id. at 1017 (“Regardless of whether the flight was legal or illegal in that sense, the 
espionage was an improper means of discovering DuPont’s trade secret.”).  Christopher 
would have come out differently if the defendant had merely stood on the sidewalk and 
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and Posner discuss Christopher with respect to the claim that there is no 
law of trade secrets, but argue that this holding simply expands the 
notion of “trespass”; this argument is belied by the fact that the aerial 
photographs would not have been “illegal” but for the fact that there 
were trade secrets on the property. 
3.  Differentiation from Other36 Intellectual Property 
Trade secrets differ from other forms of intellectual property in 
many ways.  The most significant difference is the role of public 
disclosure.  Copyright law and patent law are founded on the notion 
that creativity and innovation, respectively, are rewarded by limited 
governmental protection to facilitate recoupment of the costs of 
creation.  Furthermore, the policies of patent and copyright law favor 
building on prior work, as well as freedom for all to use subject matter 
that is outside the scope of protection.37  Trade secrets are treated 
exactly opposite—the trade secret owner is rewarded for keeping 
information that is neither new nor original away from the public for an 
unlimited duration.  Thus, information that could not be patented or 
copyrighted is still protected for as long as the owner can keep the 
information secret.  These differences lead to two criticisms of trade 
secret law.  First, there is a lack of public benefit due to the lack of 
information sharing.  Second, there is little or no marginal incentive to 
innovate because the owner obtains protection of the information by 
keeping it secret even in the absence of the law.  This Article addresses 
these criticisms below. 
Trade secrets are both similar to and dissimilar from other areas of 
intellectual property in a variety of specific ways: 
 
looked at the construction through a chain link fence.  The Christopher case shows interplay 
between reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy and improper means.  The higher the fence, 
the more likely that climbing the fence (or flying over) will be considered improper means.  
This interplay will be discussed below with respect to the economic analysis of trade secret 
rules. 
 36. Of course, this begs the question that is the subject of this Article, namely whether 
trade secrets are intellectual property in the first place, or whether if intellectual property is 
even a form of property. 
 37. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that the “incentive” versus “access” 
paradigm is important in intellectual property, but that it should not be the only analysis to 
consider); see also id. at 115–23 (discussing public benefits of the fair use doctrine in copyright 
law).  Note, however, that copyrighted works need not be published to be protected, but 
there is little doubt that the public benefits more when such works are published and when 
others can fairly use portions of them in new works. 
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• Unlike a patent, information need not be unique, novel, or non-
obvious to be protected.38 
• In fact, trade secret information need not even be original, 
allowing for the protection of information like names and phone 
numbers that would not be protected under copyright.39 
• Unlike patents and trademarks, but like copyrights, trade secret 
laws allow for the protection of identical information if two 
parties independently discover the information.40  Two 
companies can own the same trade secret, though they arguably 
would never know it. 
• Unlike all other forms of intellectual property, the right to 
exclude applies only when information is obtained by improper 
means.  This is most like copyright’s distinction between “illicit 
copying” and fair use, reverse engineering, and independent 
development.41  This is a weak analogy, however, because 
copyright does not require any wrongdoing other than the 
copying itself, whereas trade secret misappropriation requires 
“copying” in addition to other improper means. 
• Trade secrets resemble the patent requirement for usefulness42 
and the trademark requirement for actual use43 because they 
must have some independent economic value by being unknown 
to others.  This threshold is relatively low, however, and minimal 
“sweat of the brow” is usually sufficient for protection.44  
However, trade secrets only require potential value, while 
 
 38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000).  But see Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 
N.W.2d 691, 699 (Minn. 1982) (“Clearly, the CAD/CAM system as such, as the combination 
of three generally known subsystems, does not achieve the degree of novelty or 
‘unknownness’ needed for a trade secret.”).  Jostens is not generally accepted. 
 39. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); ABBA Rubber Co. 
v. Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 526 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West 1997) (“Reverse engineering or independent 
derivation alone shall not be considered improper means.”).  The UTSA does not include this 
sentence, though reverse engineering is commonly accepted as an exception to improper 
means.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (Supp. 2006); 
see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 57 P.3d 647, 650–51 (Cal. 2002). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 43. Lanham Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2000). 
 44. Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 290 P.2d 646, 654 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (finding 
that peculiar “likes and fancies” of customers are protectable). 
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trademarks require actual use in commerce, which implies actual 
value.45 
• With respect to registration, trade secrets are most like 
unregistered common law trademarks and unregistered 
copyrights.  Unlike copyrights, there is no registration 
requirement prior to filing suit,46 and unlike patents and 
trademarks, there is no examination.47 
• Finally, unlike a patent, which must be new, or a copyright, 
which must be original, a trade secret need not be absolutely 
secret to be a trade secret.48 
The differences discussed above allow trade secrets to exist without 
conflicting with other areas of intellectual property protection.  Further, 
some of these differences become important to the justification of trade 
secret law discussed below. 
B.  Brief History of Trade Secret Law 
Trade secrets owe their origination to the common law.  Though 
trade secrets originated in the early 1800s in England,49 the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts appears to be the first court in the United States 
to describe a complete view of trade secrets:50 
If [a person] invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of 
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has 
not indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against 
those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a 
property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one 
who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes 
to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons.51 
 
 45. But see Lanham Act § 1(b) (registration for intent to use). 
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 411. 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 111.  But see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2005) (requiring a 
plaintiff to identify the trade secrets at issue prior to discovery).  Note that section 2019.210 is 
formerly and better known as section 2019(d). 
 48. DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192–93 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(“Publication on the Internet does not necessarily destroy the secret if the publication is 
sufficiently obscure or transient or otherwise limited so that it does not become generally 
known to the relevant people, i.e., potential competitors or other persons to whom the 
information would have some economic value.”). 
 49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995). 
 50. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 n.23 (1974); Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Mass. 1998). 
 51. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868). 
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This formulation is Lockean in nature;52 the court in Peabody v. 
Norfolk noted both the right to an injunction for breach of trust as well 
as the inclusion of secret methods as part of the goodwill of a business 
that can be sold.53  The court discussed at length the fact that protection 
of secret information should go beyond simple breach of contract; 
instead the court discussed both implied and express contracts and 
implied and express duties.54 
By 1907, trade secrets were well embedded in the law, and the 
California Supreme Court declared “[t]hat equity will always protect 
against the unwarranted disclosure of trade secrets and confidential 
communications and the like is, of course, settled beyond 
peradventure.”55 
At some point, courts and scholars shifted focus away from the strict 
property view.  Professor Bone attributes this to a shift to legal 
positivism and realism in which the “natural law” view of trade secrets 
as property was rejected in favor of social goals.56  Justice Holmes’s 1917 
Supreme Court opinion in the E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. 
Masland57 case certainly had an effect on conventional thinking about 
trade secrets: 
The case has been considered as presenting a conflict between a 
right of property and a right to make a full defence . . . . We 
approach the question somewhat differently.  The word property 
as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed 
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact 
that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good 
faith.  Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the 
defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special 
confidence that he accepted.  The property may be denied but 
the confidence cannot be.  Therefore the starting point for the 
present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the 
defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or 
one of them.58 
 
 52. The influence of Locke is clearer in an earlier quote in the opinion:  “If a man 
establishes a business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the good will of that 
business is recognized by the law as property.”  Id. at 457. 
 53. Id. at 458–59. 
 54. Id. at 459. 
 55. Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 130 P. 1180, 1182 (Cal. 1913) (citing Peabody, 98 
Mass. 452). 
 56. Bone, supra note 5, at 259–60. 
 57. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
 58. Id. at 102. 
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This resulted in the formulation of trade secrets in the Restatement 
(First) of Torts in which a property justification for trade secrets is 
expressly rejected.59  It is telling that trade secrets are described in the 
section entitled “Interference with Advantageous Economic 
Relations”—trade secrets were now clearly considered to be a part of 
unfair competition, and even today trade secrets are covered in the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.  The unfair competition 
and breach of confidence view of trade secrets continued, and to a large 
extent still continues as the modern view of trade secrets.60 
In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws recommended the UTSA.61  The model law takes no position 
on whether or not trade secrets are property, but it does set forth a 
broader and more protective version of trade secret law than was 
present in the Restatement.62  As of 2004, forty-four states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted some version of the UTSA.63 
II.  PROPERTY AS A POTENTIAL JUSTIFICATION 
Any normative justification of trade secrets must begin with 
consideration of whether trade secrets are property.  To many, if trade 
secrets are property, then laws protecting them are normatively 
justified.  Thus, the question of whether or not trade secrets are 
property has raged on for many years.  While some wonder why it 
matters,64 others believe that the shift toward calling intangible assets 
“property” has created and will continue to create a shift toward the 
overprotection of intellectual property.65  Whether trade secrets are 
 
 59. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939). 
The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret 
because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently advanced and 
rejected.  The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded only by a 
general duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon breach of this duty . . . . 
Id. 
 60. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property:  Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal 
a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 396 (1989). 
 61. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (Supp. 2006). 
 62. Some of these differences are discussed supra Part I.A. 
 63. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SECRETS § 1:5.1 (2d ed. 2005).  The states still 
using the Restatement (First) of Torts are Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and 
Wyoming.  Given the pervasiveness of the UTSA, it is interesting that most scholarship on 
trade secrets continues to focus on the Restatement version.  The modern view of trade 
secrets must be informed by the uniform statute. 
 64. Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 715, 716 (1993). 
 65. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 84; Lemley, supra note 15, at 1037; Samuelson, supra 
RISCH ARTICLE   
16 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1 
 
property depends on who you ask; I examine the competing theories 
below and then provide one of my own. 
A.  Defining Property 
Three primary theories consider trade secrets as property:  
exclusivity theory, integrated theory, and bundle theory. 
1.  Exclusivity Theory 
Even those who believe exclusive rights are the sole requirement for 
property disagree about whether trade secrets should be property.  For 
example, Judge Frank Easterbrook argues that intellectual property 
includes the right to exclude, just like real or personal property.66  This 
analysis was followed in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.:67  “The right to 
exclude others is generally ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle 
of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”68  The problem 
with this argument is that trade secrets are not actually exclusive, as 
pointed out by the California Supreme Court:  “The owner of the trade 
secret is protected only against the appropriation of the secret by 
improper means and the subsequent use or disclosure of the improperly 
acquired secret.  There are various legitimate means, such as reverse 
engineering, by which a trade secret can be acquired and used.”69  
Others, however, look to Thomas Jefferson’s analysis of the issue: 
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.  
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from 
them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may 
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to 
the will and convenience of the society, without claim or 
complaint from anybody.70 
 
note 60, at 399; see, e.g., Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 995 F.2d 1173, 1178 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (holding that trade secrets cannot be property unless they show novelty and 
originality).  Interestingly, trade secrets allow for greater damages than patents.  Hill, supra 
note 8, at 13. 
 66. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 108, 112 (1990) (“[the] right to exclude in intellectual property is no different in 
principle from the right to exclude in physical property”). 
 67. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 68. Id. at 1011 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
 69. Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 57 P.3d 647, 650 (Cal. 2002). 
 70. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 334 (Library ed. 1903); see Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (outlining Jefferson’s philosophy on the nature of patent monopolies). 
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The limit of this argument is that regardless of the normative basis 
for such a right, the legally enforceable right to exclude is always 
defined by the “will and convenience of society,” even for real 
property.71  There is no reason why a real property owner must have a 
right to exclude others even if he or she has the ability to do so by 
building a fence; instead, the law allows the owner to exclude even 
without a fence.  Similarly, those with patents are given the same 
rights—patent law does not have an independent development or fair 
use exception.72  Ideas, real property, personal property, and other 
tangible or intangible assets all have the legal rights that the state 
grants.73  The primary difference is the difficulty of enforcement; real 
and personal property may be unique, allowing for exclusivity through 
possession,74 while current technology does not allow a purging of ideas 
in the brain.75  Thus, it is not clear why the right to exclude should make 
trade secrets property, or the lack thereof should exclude trade secrets 
from being property. 
2.  Integrated Theory 
Rather than looking at exclusion, integration theorists look at how 
the asset is acquired, used, and disposed.76  They argue that exclusivity is 
not enough, nor even necessary, to define property.77  Even then, 
scholars cannot agree.  For example, Adam Mossoff argues that trade 
secrets are property because they are acquired by the actions of the 
trade secret owner because discoverers can make their “own use” of the 
information because it is secret and because the owners can decide how 
the information is disposed of by publication or transfer.78  This theory, 
however, also fails to resonate.  How is it that two people can acquire 
 
 71. Of course, many might agree that there is a moral right to exclude even without the 
benefit of the law. 
 72. Even this statement is too much; patent law limits exclusive use in the area of 
certain business method patents and medical use.  35 U.S.C. §§ 273, 287(c) (2000). 
 73. For example, real property rights do not include the right to exclude in adverse 
possession, nor do they include the right to limit flyovers, which were excluded in 
Christopher.  See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 74. There is a reason for the maxim that “possession is nine-tenths of the law.” 
 75. Such technology is not outside the purview of science fiction, however.  If ideas 
could be purged from the minds of others, then Jefferson’s argument would be weaker still. 
 76. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?  Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 371, 405–06 (2003); see also Samuelson, supra note 60, at 370 (the most important rights 
associated with property are use, enjoyment, possession, transfer, and exclusion). 
 77. Mossoff, supra note 76, at 405–06. 
 78. Id. at 418. 
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and use the same secret?  Why should acquisition and use of an idea 
that is free for all to discover merit any protection? 
Pamela Samuelson argues the contrary.  Even though information 
may be acquired, used, and transferred, she relies on the Masland point 
of view that trade secret misappropriation is about breach of 
confidences or other use of improper means.  Trade secrets are not 
property, but instead the enforcement of social values.79 
3.  Bundle Theory 
The middle ground is to treat trade secrets as a “Hohfeldian” bundle 
of rights,80 wherein trade secret rights are simply a collection of social 
rights and duties.  This is an approach this Article takes below as part of 
substantive property analysis.  A problem with the bundle of rights 
theory is that the word “property” ceases to have any real meaning.81  
With the bundle, it is impossible to determine what particular bundle 
makes a set of rights property and what bundle renders a set of rights 
“not property.” 
4.  An Alternate Categorization 
It is because of the fundamental disagreement among the three 
theories above that the debate about trade secrets (and other intangible 
assets, for that matter) continues.  In the alternative, this Article 
proposes different categories of intellectual property, at least as those 
categories apply to trade secrets.  I call the categories “collateral 
property” and “substantive property.” 
Aside from the effect that any nomenclature might have on the 
collective mindshare,82 whether trade secrets are called property or not 
matters primarily in cases where a statutory or constitutional right is 
triggered by “property.”83  I call this “collateral property.” 
 
 79. Samuelson, supra note 60, at 374–75. 
 80. See generally Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). 
 81. Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 30 (1986) 
(“[Modern scholars] see property in resources as consisting of the infinitely divisible claims to 
possession, use, disposition, and profit that people might have with respect to those things. 
There is, on this conception, no essential core of those rights that naturally constitutes 
ownership.”). 
 82. See Lemley, supra note 15. 
 83. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Mass. 
1998) (holding that trade secrets are property under section 93A of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts, which requires a loss of property to allow for an injunction). 
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For all other intents and purposes, trade secrets are a bundle of 
rights; the only differences between trade secrets, patents, and real 
property are the collection and mixture of rights.  I call this “substantive 
property.”  Thus, whether trade secrets are normatively justified as 
“substantive property” will depend on whether the bundle of rights 
itself is normatively justified.84 
This is not to say that property rights are unimportant or that trade 
secrets are not property.  Indeed, if you asked most business owners, 
they would say that their trade secrets are their property.  This tends to 
support the philosophical and populist justification for trade secrets 
discussed below.  However, because trade secrets are so different from 
real and personal property, and even from other forms of intellectual 
property, normative analysis of specific property rights granted is 
helpful to justify why trade secret owners call their information 
property. 
B.  Collateral Property 
There is no shortage of judges and scholars willing to call trade 
secrets “property.” 85  The reasons vary, but they reflect in large part an 
underlying acceptance that information can be “owned” so long as it is 
not generally available.  Normatively, however, the moniker “property” 
does not necessarily justify protecting information from “improper” 
discovery by others.  Instead, calling trade secrets property is usually 
important in cases where some important decision factor other than 
trade secret misappropriation depends on whether the information at 
issue is considered property or not.  In fact, some cases may go so far as 
to protect information as property even if it is not a trade secret.86 
For example, section 2860 of the California Labor Code states that 
the employer “owns” everything the employee “acquires” by virtue of 
 
 84. It is here that Mark Lemley is concerned.  Lemley, supra note 15.  Because the term 
“property” is rarely discussed with such precision, he worries that lawmakers will grant more 
and more rights to intellectual property so that their “bundle” approximates the bundle of 
rights associated with real property.  See also Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 150. 
 85. Milgrim attempts to find every case doing so.  1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON 
TRADE SECRETS 73–98 (2006). 
 86. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237 (1918) (stating news reports 
are “quasi property” with respect to competitors, even if not with respect to the public); USM 
Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 903 (Mass. 1979) (“A plaintiff who may not 
claim trade secret protection either because it failed to take reasonable steps to preserve its 
secrecy or because the information, while confidential, is only ‘business information,’ may still 
be entitled to some relief against one who improperly procures such information.”). 
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his or her employment.87  If trade secrets were not “property” in the 
sense of ownership, then the Labor Code would be illusory—employees 
could claim that they own every discovery made using the resources of 
the employer.88  In an extension of this concept, the Supreme Court 
determined that unpublished news stories gathered from public sources 
were “property” of the Wall Street Journal for the purposes of insider 
trading laws.89  Similarly, in 1998, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
relied on Peabody to support a finding that trade secret customer 
information was “property” for the purposes of a Massachusetts unfair 
competition claim.90  In each of these instances, the collateral right 
attaches regardless of how we might consider liability in a trade secret 
action. 
Each of these examples hardly shakes the foundation of intellectual 
property law.  It is quite reasonable from a transaction costs (as well as 
common sense) point of view that employers will own the confidential 
information created by their employees during the course of business.  It 
is also quite reasonable that trade secret misappropriation would be 
called unfair competition. 
In an oft cited case, the U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
address this state law issue and both affirmed that trade secrets could be 
property and left the issue up to the states.91  In Ruckelshaus, pesticide 
manufacturer Monsanto challenged, as a Fifth Amendment taking, a 
statute that allowed the Environmental Protection Agency to disclose 
its trade secret data to the public.92  The Court determined that under 
 
 87. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (West 2003). 
 88. See, e.g., Am. Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 308 P.2d 494, 496–97 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1957) (stating that confidential information is property of the employer, general information 
is not).  But see Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 162–63 (arguing that the default should not be 
that the employer owns all information and that the employer must instead give employees 
clear notice of what the employer considers to be a trade secret). 
 89. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (“Confidential business 
information has long been recognized as property.”).  Intellectual property scholars are 
troubled by Carpenter.  See Samuelson, supra note 60, at 396 (stating that Carpenter is 
“disturbing” because employees had no reason to know that their employer might consider 
their work or production schedules property).  On the other hand, from a labor management 
point of view the decision makes sense; allowing employees to maintain rights in confidential 
company information—whether or not a trade secret—would be disastrous on a level far 
greater than any musings about the justification for trade secret law. 
 90. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 546–47 (Mass. 1998) 
(holding that trade secrets are property under section 93A of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts, which requires a loss of property to allow for an injunction). 
 91. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 92. Id. at 999. 
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Missouri law, which followed the Restatement (First) of Torts at the 
time, trade secrets were property, and thus could be subject to a taking.93  
In doing so, the Court relied in part on a Missouri case decided in 1917,94 
which makes sense because the shift from “property” to “unfair 
competition” around the time of Masland had not yet become 
widespread. 
In his treatise, Milgrim proudly calls his second chapter “Trade 
Secrets as Property”95 and relies on cases like those above to argue that 
trade secrets are property.  In that chapter, however, Milgrim focuses 
less on the policy reasons for having trade secrets in the first place and 
more on the collateral aspects of trade secret property, such as 
assignment, takings, and inheritance.96  The questions Milgrim addresses 
have long been settled, and they do not rely on a “substantive” property 
view of trade secrets.  For example, a valid contract is “property” under 
the takings clause.97  This does not mean a contract automatically has 
the same rights as real property. 
Thus, while trade secrets may quite reasonably be considered 
property in a variety of circumstances, the underlying question is 
whether such treatment should have a policy impact on trade secrets 
qua trade secrets.98  While treatment of intangible information as 
property in collateral areas may be substantive judgments, those 
judgments do not shed much light on why we have trade secrets.  
Answering the normative question requires further examination of the 
scope of rights granted to particular information. 
C.  Substantive Property Rights 
The treatment of trade secrets as substantive property dates back to 
the inception of trade secret law in the United States:  “In this court, it is 
 
 93. Id. at 1003–04. 
 94. Luckett v. Orange Julep Co., 196 S.W. 740, 743 (Mo. 1917) (“[S]aid formula is the 
sole property of the plaintiffs.”). 
 95. 1 MILGRIM, supra note 85.  Milgrim is quick to point out that “Trade Secrets as 
Property” used to be his first chapter, but the passage of the UTSA required him to put a 
definitional discussion first.  Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (stating that a valid contract was 
the subject of a taking). 
 98. Professor Chiappetta and others call this “conversational” property and assume that 
the word “property” used in conversation implies a certain set of rights unless precision is 
used.  Carter, supra note 64, at 716; Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 150.  I argue the contrary—
calling trade secrets “property” is not relevant to modern trade secret misappropriation case 
law.  The UTSA has not been amended in more than twenty years. 
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settled that a secret art is a legal subject of property.”99  Professor Bone 
explains that this supposedly “settled” generalization was the 
culmination of prior cases that used a collateral understanding of 
property.100  That is, Peabody transitioned collateral rights into 
substantive rights.101  This conversion had benefits under nineteenth-
century law; no injunction could issue in equity unless the secret was 
“property.” 102  Further, privity was no longer required if the trade secret 
was property.103 
However, a “conversion” argument does not necessarily mean that 
trade secrets should not be considered “substantive” property.  For 
example, Peabody relies on a much earlier case, Vickery v. Welch,104 in 
which the trade secrets are substantive and not collateral.  In Vickery, 
the defendant seller was to sell the exclusive right to a secret process as 
part of a conveyance of a mill, but the seller claimed that he had the 
right to disclose the process to anyone he wished.105  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court ruled that the value of a secret process lies in its 
exclusivity; the ability of one person to use information and to keep 
others from using it is exactly what gives the information a competitive 
advantage.106 
For some, the exclusivity discussed in Vickery would be sufficient to 
call any given right “property.”  For others, this distinction is 
meaningless, because competitors can reverse engineer the secret or 
discover it by independent means.  Furthermore, it is difficult to say that 
one can ever exclusively possess information.  If someone “takes” a 
person’s information, the original owner is not divested of possession.  
Regardless of the outcome of such a debate, it cannot be said that the 
“property” right granted in Peabody and Vickery was based solely on 
collateral concerns.  Instead, Vickery stands for the proposition that 
secret information has value precisely because of its secret nature and 
not because courts call that information property.  This aspect of trade 
 
 99. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 459–60 (1868). 
 100. Bone, supra note 5, at 251–54. 
 101. Id. at 253–54. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837). 
 105. Id. at 525–27 (determining whether the seller had a right to disclose the secret is 
substantive, not collateral). 
 106. Id.; accord Cent. Transp. Co. v. Pullman’s Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 53 (1891) 
(“Upon the sale of a secret process, a covenant, express or implied, that the seller will not use 
the process himself or communicate it to any other person, is lawful, because the process must 
be kept secret in order to be of any value . . . .”). 
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secrets continues to the present—a key requirement under the UTSA is 
that the information must have independent value based on its 
secrecy.107 
One would think that the question of whether and how trade secrets 
are treated as property has been answered—for more than 150 years no 
less—but this is not so.  Nearly two centuries after Vickery, the 
California Supreme Court summarized the transition from the 
Restatement (First) of Torts to the UTSA, but explicitly refused to 
answer the question posed here, namely whether trade secrets should be 
treated as property and whether such treatment makes a difference in 
practice. 108  Instead, the court summarized the history of trade secrets 
(including citation to Masland) and argued that substantive trade secret 
rights do not fall exclusively under either the property view or the 
liability view.109  It is perhaps more helpful to consider trade secrets as 
comprising a bundle of rights.  The question is whether this bundle is 
justified; Part III examines three justifications. 
D.  The Bundle of Rights 
A substantive trade secret “property right” is comprised of a 
collection of rights associated with what might be done with particular 
information.  This, too, is hardly an earth shattering proclamation.  The 
complexity, it seems, is detailing what rights are included in the bundle 
and whether or not a particular right is appropriately justified.110  To 
date, this analysis remains incomplete.111 
In all events, a comparison to the real property bundle is not apt.112  
Information simply cannot be protected in the same way that real 
property can be protected, at the very least because information can be 
 
 107. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (Supp. 2006). 
 108. Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 57 P.3d 647, 649–50 (Cal. 2002). 
 109. Id.  But see DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 13 (Cal. 2003) (“By 
creating a limited property right in information, trade secret law ‘acts as an incentive for 
investment in innovation.’” (citation omitted)).  The California Supreme Court goes on to list 
almost every single justification for trade secrets.  See discussion infra Part III.  The court 
wanted to make a strong statement about the policy of trade secrets to show why the First 
Amendment did not preempt an injunction.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 110. See infra Parts III, IV (discussing the justification of various rights under trade 
secret law). 
 111. Professor Chiappetta describes the bundle as the right to rely on the confidence of 
others and the right to be free from “bad acts.”  Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 151–52.  This 
description is too broad to be useful if one is trying to compare the rights to personal, real, or 
intellectual property. 
 112. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 1032. 
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replicated without loss, while real property is unique.  That said, the 
suggestion that trade secret rights should be protected like “any other” 
property is hardly the end of the world for efficient intellectual property 
laws.  While those who disfavor the property motif may bristle that 
comparisons to real property will lead to overprotection of information, 
it is quite possible that the focus is wrong.113  Real property is not the 
“infinite rights of exclusion” straw man that it is made out to be.  If the 
bundle of rights for real property were unending, there would be no 
nuisance, attractive nuisance, zoning regulations, land use regulations, 
building codes, adverse possession, fence laws, endangered species laws, 
public easements, and so forth.114  Instead, each of the above laws and 
their limitations on the real property bundle of rights gets analyzed for 
normative justification, economic efficiency, and other considerations.  
So, too, are the bundle of rights afforded to trade secrets and any other 
intellectual property, for that matter.  Rather than stopping at the 
comparison to real property, it may make sense to focus on the limits of 
real property rights and analogize them to intangibles.115 
What, then, is the bundle of rights associated with trade secrets?  It 
is not simply the right to exclude, nor is it simply the right to acquire, 
use, and dispose.116  Furthermore, the rights must be additional to and/or 
different from those that would exist in the absence of trade secret 
law;117  otherwise, there would be no need to have trade secrets in the 
first place.  The following are rights and duties abstracted from trade 
secret law: 
• The right to keep certain information secret and still obtain legal 
protection;118 
 
 113. As noted above, the one area where the nomenclature matters is the extent to 
which the term “property” has an effect on laws that create a bundle of rights that is greater 
than necessary to achieve the goals of intellectual property law.  See generally id.  However, 
with respect to trade secrets, despite the “property” brand since Ruckelshaus, trade secret law 
has not shifted toward overprotection.  But see Samuelson, supra note 60 (expressing 
concerns about the extension of protection to non-trade secret information). 
 114. While appropriate treatment of “property” in the law may require careful 
judgment, some of these examples were borne of common law; as such, one cannot say that 
protection will be ever-expanding just because something is called “property.” 
 115. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Rights Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (conducting an extensive review of limits in real 
property and analogizing those limits to intellectual property). 
 116. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 152 (“[W]e must be extremely wary of gap-filling and 
demand precision in any ‘trade secrets as property’ discussion.”). 
 117. For example, the right not to have a contract breached is not a right that comes 
with trade secret law; that would exist anyway. 
 118. This may seem obvious given the fact that these are secrets, but this right is a very 
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- Including the right to exclude others from disclosing certain 
information, so long as certain prerequisites are met;119 
- Including the right to exclude others—even those without 
privity or actual knowledge—from using certain information, 
so long as certain prerequisites are met;120 
• The duty to attempt to keep information secret;121 
• The right to use certain information as one wishes and still 
receive protection even if others have the same information;122 
• The right to not use certain information if one wishes and still 
obtain legal protection;123 
• The right to recover damages for harm caused by illicit use or 
disclosure of certain information, so long as certain prerequisites 
are met;124 
• The right to recover the benefits from others for the illicit use or 
disclosure of certain information, so long as certain prerequisites 
are met;125 
• The right to transfer, devise, or otherwise make exclusive grants 
of certain information;126 and 
• The right to compensation for a government taking of certain 
information.127 
Most of the rights and duties on this list are different from those 
associated with real property, personal property, and even other types 
of intellectual property.  So long as discussion about the rights of trade 
secret holders points to the above bundle,128 then the risk of 
overprotection is limited.  Keeping those that make the rules focused on 
the bundle and not “property” rhetoric may be difficult, but this should 
not be a large problem with respect to trade secrets.  Because the nature 
 
clear differentiator from patent law. 
 119. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619 (Supp. 2006). 
 120. Id. §§ 1(2), 2. 
 121. Id. § 1(4). 
 122. This, too, may seem obvious, but not all patents may be practiced by their owners, 
if they are based on someone else’s patent.  The Patent Act only allows remedies for 
infringement, not a right to use. 
 123. This right is granted under the UTSA, but not in the Restatement.  UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 5; see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939). 
 124. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See generally 1 MILGRIM, supra note 85. 
 127. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 128. Of course, the terms “certain information” and “certain prerequisites” must be 
defined, and I do so later in this Article. 
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of the information is by definition secret, the impact of expanding rights 
to trade secrets on the public is quite limited.  Thus, the policy debate is 
between many companies who want to simultaneously keep and 
appropriate secret information.  It is not surprising that the protection 
under trade secret law has not expanded significantly during the time of 
the UTSA, which is now more than twenty-five years old.129 
III.  THE JUSTIFICATION FOR TRADE SECRETS 
This Part addresses—from strongest to weakest—three alternative 
normative justifications for the bundle of rights associated with trade 
secret law:  economic justifications, philosophical justifications, and 
populist justifications. 
A.  Economic Justification of Trade Secrets 
Perhaps the best justification for the existence of trade secrets is a 
purely economic one,130 for two primary reasons.  First, trade secrets 
relate to the economic value of information; it stands to reason that 
economic analysis is the appropriate way to justify the law.131  Second, 
economic analysis shows that the particular bundle of rights associated 
with trade secrets adds to societal wealth in a defensible, potentially 
measurable and provable way. 
In summary, the bundle of rights associated with trade secret law is 
justified because it enhances the marginal benefits of society more than 
the marginal costs.  Ironically, the best justification also requires the 
most explanation.  Thus, the Article includes a complete analysis in Part 
IV, which analyzes the marginal societal benefits (and costs) associated 
with the bundle of rights granted by trade secret law.  As will be 
discussed below, the primary benefit of trade secret law is the decrease 
in both the amount spent on protecting secrets and the amount spent by 
those who seek to learn them. 
However, creating incentives to innovate is a very minor justification 
of trade secret law.132  To be sure, additional protection of secret 
 
 129. Indeed, trade secret rights in practice have not been significantly broadened in the 
last hundred years, though there are always outlier cases. 
 130. This is the case, at least, in our market economy.  Economists subscribing to a view 
of shared resources might disagree.  See, e.g., EUGEN LOEBL, HUMANOMICS:  HOW WE CAN 
MAKE THE ECONOMY SERVE US—NOT DESTROY US 29–34 (1976). 
 131. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 93. 
 132. For other criticism of this justification, see Bone, supra note 5, and Chiappetta, 
supra note 8. 
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information does provide some incentives, discussed below with respect 
to the labor value theory, as well as with respect to forced disclosure of 
information. 
Because forced disclosure is not the status quo, however, the 
marginal incentive to innovate provided by trade secret law is small133 
because companies would still protect secret information by—obviously 
enough—keeping such information secret.134  Such information need not 
be an innovation—even the earliest trade secret law protected customer 
information.135 
Patents and copyrights foster an incentive to create by allowing for a 
period of exclusive use.  The exclusivity is required because of the 
“public good” nature of innovations and original works.  If others could 
freely use innovations and original works, then the creator might not be 
able to recover the cost of creation.  By allowing the creator exclusive 
use, the creator can more readily recoup costs of creation. 
In industries where there is no self-help, patent and copyright may 
be the only source of protection to encourage innovation.  Trade secrets 
do not fall into this category because the inability to protect information 
by self-help does not change with trade secret law.  If a company cannot 
keep its secrets confidential, trade secret protection will not add new 
abilities to keep the information secret.  Thus, information that owners 
would otherwise keep secret shares little of this “public use” property; if 
information can be kept secret through self-help, then owners will spend 
more money to keep the information secret even in the absence of the 
law.  This is discussed in more detail below. 
As a result, trade secret law (or even secrecy without the law) does 
not necessarily confer an opportunity for the owner to charge more than 
would be available on the open market.136  In fact, to the extent that 
 
 133. One would expect a forced disclosure rule to hinder incentives for innovation.  The 
extent of such an effect would depend on the mix of potentially patentable innovations versus 
unpatentable innovations. 
 134. To the extent that trade secrets eliminate wasteful spending or otherwise reduce 
the cost (or increase the value) of research, then companies may spend more on innovation—
this is not what I mean by incentives to innovate in this context. 
 135. See, e.g., Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 130 P. 1180 (Cal. 1913).  Further, a 
primary economic question is whether a company should divulge its information in a patent 
application.  For a thorough discussion, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 294–333, 
354–71. 
 136. It is not clear that copyrights or patents confer this right either.  While an invention 
might be incorporated into a device such as a DVD player, one cannot say that monopoly 
profits are available to the maker of the DVD player.  Indeed, the invention might be 
necessary simply to compete. 
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trade secrets reduce production costs, they would lead to lower pricing 
in the market.  A trade secret must have competitive value, but every 
company has information that has competitive value.  Take customer 
lists, for example.  Knowing who to contact will reduce costs of sales vis 
a vis a company’s competitors.  This fact does not mean that a company 
can extract monopoly pricing; while the company may have a “leg up,” 
product quality and pricing will still affect competition. 
The same is true for a secret process for making goods.  Assume 
there is a secret process for making food taste better or making a widget 
more cheaply.  Producers compete with other food and widget makers, 
and they still have price competition.  Their competitors will have their 
own methods for taste enhancement and cost reduction. 
One concrete example is the tax program market:  TurboTax and 
TaxCut.  Each product costs approximately the same amount and the 
two are in stiff competition.  Each has source code that is a trade secret; 
having that source code gives each an advantage over the other to the 
extent that the code includes special routines, and both have an 
advantage over those who do not have a product.  Now, if an Intuit 
employee wants to compete, he or she might take the source code and 
call the new product “SuperTax.”  That employee will save 
development time and can undercut the price the other two companies 
charge because of lower costs.  That lower price does not mean that the 
original pricing was monopolistic—the prices charged would reflect the 
marginal costs of producing the program with some rate of return on the 
investment in development.  Thus, even if there were no trade secret 
law, Intuit would likely create a tax program if it saw market demand, 
and it would want to protect the TurboTax source code, even though it 
has no monopoly rents from its trade secrets. 
B.  Philosophical Justification of Trade Secrets 
There are two primary philosophical branches that justify trade 
secrets:  labor value and veil of ignorance. 
1.  Labor Value Theory 
The most cited philosophical theory, as reflected in the Peabody137 
case, is one where those who create value through their labor ought to 
 
 137. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457 (1868) (“It is the policy of the law, for the 
advantage of the public, to encourage and protect invention and commercial enterprise.  If a 
man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the good will of 
that business is recognized by the law as property.”). 
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“own” the end product of their labor.138  This theory is often called a 
“Lockean” theory after John Locke and his theory of property.  Locke 
posited that one who improves the land with his or her labor should be 
entitled to ownership of that land.139  Under this theory, even 
information that is not secret could still be property.140  This theory is the 
implicit basis for any business owner’s consideration of trade secrets as 
valuable property. 
An initial criticism of this theory is that Locke was dealing with real 
property and not intellectual property, which can be “possessed” by two 
people at the same time.  For example, the Supreme Court ruled in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.141 that pure facts, like 
names and addresses in a telephone book, cannot be protected by 
copyright simply because they were obtained by the “sweat of the 
brow.”142  This criticism does not necessarily apply to trade secrets, 
however.  The value of the trade secret is not its novelty (like a patent) 
or its originality (like a copyright) but rather its secrecy.  It follows that 
the labor used to discover or assemble such information may “belong” 
to the originator if that information is not generally known.  Two people 
might even know the same information, and each might own it as 
against others who do not. 
 
 138. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–03 (1984) (citing Locke as a 
justification of trade secrets as property). 
 139. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (J.W. Gough ed., 
Basil Blackwell 1956) (1690).  But see LOEBL, supra note 130, at 32–33. 
The owner of a factory or business is making full use of the economic, social, and 
cultural infrastructure which society has paid for. . . . If we think in terms of this new 
concept of ownership, however, then we can regard the owner of a means of 
production . . . as a kind of trustee who uses the nation’s “capital.” 
Id. 
 140. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (protecting published 
news and stating that “the right to acquire property by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful 
business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard property already acquired”).  
In International News, the value was based on timeliness and not secrecy, and was thus 
protected.  Professor Bone criticizes Lockean theory because it does not explain the secrecy 
requirement.  Bone, supra note 5, at 284.  If one assumes, however, that the information has 
value because it is secret, then the underlying normative basis for requiring and protecting 
secrecy makes sense, even if the owner might use self-help to keep the secret as well.  If the 
information does not have value because it is generally known, then there would be little 
“labor value” to protect it because the information is already available. 
 141. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 142. Id. at 353–55.  Note, however, that an entire telephone book can be protected from 
slavish reproduction even if a large amount of the information within it may not be protected.  
Id. at 361. 
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Thus, under this Lockean view, we would not necessarily expect 
trade secret rights to be lost upon inadvertent or wrongful disclosure.  
This leads to another potential criticism of the Lockean theory:  it may 
tend to overprotect information in contravention to the end goal of 
innovation and freedom of information.  The argument is that labor 
should not be enough to create exclusive ownership of information 
where valuable social goals can be achieved through the sharing of 
information.  Locke, however, would not go so far as to protect property 
to the exclusion of all others in society.  Locke makes clear that his 
theory is based on the non-scarcity of land, such that one person’s 
improvement of land will not deprive others of their ability to improve 
neighboring land.143  Analogized to trade secrets, this principle means 
that trade secret owners should not be able to exclude others who 
independently develop the same information.  This means, as well, that 
once information is generally known, even if wrongfully, then the rest of 
society should not be restrained from using the information to 
“improve” their own businesses. 
Perhaps the most persuasive criticism of Lockean theory is that the 
underlying support for it is lacking.  For example, why should the state 
of nature result in a world where people own what they create?  After 
all, Hobbes comes to a contrary result, namely that nature is a “state of 
war” in which each person is free to take from others and/or self-defend 
until society as a whole agrees to an offshoot of the Golden Rule.144  
Additionally, according to the strong form of the Coase theorem, if 
transaction costs are low, then it should not matter who is initially 
granted possessory rights, so there is no reason why the developer of 
information necessarily must have rights.145 
Detractors thus assert that Locke must fall back on a utilitarian 
analysis for justification, such that the philosophical analysis collapses 
into an efficiency analysis.146  I do not give great weight to this criticism 
from a normative justification point of view.  Norms are broadly 
 
 143. LOCKE, supra note 139, §§ 36–38; see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in 
Self-Expression:  Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 
YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (discussing Locke-based limits on ownership). 
 144. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. I, ch. 14 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil 
Blackwell 1960) (1651). 
 145. See also Lemley, supra note 15, at 1038–39 (discussing property distribution 
arguments associated with the Coase theorem).  See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 146. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1031 n.1, 1068. 
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accepted standards,147 and so long as the Lockean theory is widely 
accepted as a morally justified foundation for rights, then the theory is 
sufficient justification for the rights, whether or not the result is efficient 
and whether or not one can determine exactly where the lines can be 
drawn from the theory.148  Moral rights in works of art are a good 
example of a broadly accepted (in Europe, at least) set of rights that are 
not necessarily economically efficient.149  Nonetheless, one can advance 
an argument that there is normative justification for the notion that 
artists should be able to control how their art is displayed, regardless of 
how we might want to balance those rights against owners of the 
tangible expression of that art or even against society.  Whether one 
agrees that widely accepted norms are a sufficient justification will 
depend on whether one agrees with the moral force of the underlying 
reasoning.150 
For those who disagree with the moral force of this argument unless 
there is a utilitarian justification, Locke relied in part on utilitarian 
analysis—namely that labor put into the land will improve it for all of 
society.151  This is similar to the notion that intellectual property laws 
(and the limitations placed on exclusive use of such intangible assets) 
are designed to foster innovation and creativity.  Even trade secrets, 
which by definition are not publicly disclosed, can have a wealth 
enhancing effect, such as lower prices for consumers and enhanced 
quality of goods. 
Furthermore, there are other utilitarian explanations for the 
Lockean theory.  For example, owners may tend to value the 
information they “discover” through their labor more than others, even 
if idiosyncratically.152  Even the simple fact that a company is using a 
 
 147. A norm is “a standard, model, or pattern regarded as typical.”  THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1199 (4th ed. 2000). 
 148. But see David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2004) (stating there is little benefit in a theory that “makes no predictions about how 
adopting it as law would affect the real world”). 
 149. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).  This is a weaker version of moral rights than is 
available in Europe, but still provides protection even to those who no longer own possessory 
or copyright rights in an object. 
 150. This is always true—many widely accepted “norms” are morally repugnant to 
others. 
 151. LOCKE, supra note 139, §§ 37–39.  Although there is no tragedy of the commons 
with respect to information, trade secret information can still be used for the benefit of 
society, and protection gives incentives to do so. 
 152. This may even simply arise from cognitive dissonance, which is a psychological 
condition whereby people will sometimes modify their beliefs to synchronize contradictory 
attitudes.  Cognitive Dissonance (L. Festinger), Explorations in Learning & Instruction:  The 
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particular but otherwise publicly available process to the exclusion of 
other processes can have value; the fact that competitors may 
overestimate the barriers to entry into a market has a real, if difficult to 
measure, value to the owner.  An attribution of higher value warrants 
protection of trade secrets that includes the right to exclude where the 
information would be kept secret by default.153 
Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that people gain utility (more 
aptly a reduction in disutility) from the security associated with the 
ability to keep others from taking or using what they value to their 
detriment.154  This utility extends beyond reducing expenditures to 
protect information; reducing the worry associated with potentially 
losing (or losing value of) a valuable asset creates utility.155 
Finally, the strong form of Coase theorem assumes that transaction 
costs are zero, but in the real world, transaction costs are common and 
often high, especially with respect to licenses of secret information.156  
As a result, the right should initially be vested in the person whereby 
value and transaction costs are optimized.157  Someone who expends 
labor to develop a trade secret—rather than to license the information 
from someone else—has already considered the cost/benefit choices, or 
the labor would not have been expended in the first place.  Thus, in the 
absence of any clear justification to the contrary, if there are to be any 
rights at all, then initial rights should be placed with the developer of the 
secret. 
The end result of each of the above utilitarian “justifications” that 
give moral force to the labor theory is an increased incentive to develop 
 
Theory Into Practice Database, http://tip.psychology.org/festinge.html (last visited Nov. 4, 
2006).  Analogized to information, if one invests an extensive amount, then one might 
(irrationally) value it more highly than it is otherwise worth in order to eliminate the 
dissonance of the truth that the information has little value to others. 
 153. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:  An 
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 760–62 (1996). 
 154. Hill, supra note 8, at 10 (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability Rules:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1105–06 (1972)) (discussing the benefits of “control” in a property rule); see also Wendy 
J. Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 
VA. L. REV. 149, 225–27 (1992) (discussing negative effects on the holder’s control and 
autonomy).  This discussion simplifies matters by collapsing unjust enrichment moral theory 
into a Lockean form of utility maximization. 
 155. This is similar to the utility that people gain from not being “on the run” from 
police.  Aside from the costs associated with avoiding capture, a criminal will also suffer 
disutility related to always looking over his or her shoulder. 
 156. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 365–66. 
 157. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1038. 
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information that becomes a trade secret.  If exclusive use were to be 
eliminated (or if owners were forced to share their secrets with the 
world), the incentive to create would certainly decrease, even if not 
entirely. 
It is important to note the subtle difference between a complete 
economic justification and the utilitarian application of the labor value 
theory described here.  A utilitarian application of labor value theory 
only goes so far as to say that owners should receive some limited 
exclusivity.  A full economic analysis, however, looks at the entire range 
of rights to determine if a particular bundle increases or even maximizes 
social wealth.158  For example, one might say that someone who works 
the land should have the right to exclude others based on a 
philosophical/utilitarian justification, but the precise costs and benefits 
of a public easement may be analyzed separately for efficiency. 
Lockean theory justifies at least some protection for the fruits of 
trade secret owners’ labor, whether the support comes from a belief that 
natural rights are sufficiently moral or from the utility of granting 
ownership in a particular way.  It is true that the theory as applied to 
trade secrets is insufficient to justify any particular bundle of rights, but 
the protection of secrets in general is certainly supported, as is the 
notion that others can independently develop the same information. 
2.  Original Position Theory 
Contractarian theories relate to hypothetical bargaining of a set of 
rules by hypothetical individuals who have an interest in the outcome.  
The result of such bargaining is theoretically normatively justified by ex 
ante agreements to be bound by a set of rules.  John Rawls popularized 
one such contractarian theory called the “veil of ignorance.”159  The veil 
of ignorance is a hypothetical “state of nature” that predates the 
distribution of rights in which the people making the decision about the 
distribution do not know what position they will occupy after the 
distribution is complete.  Rawls suggests that those forming a society 
under the veil of ignorance would implement the “maximin” principle—
namely selecting a distribution of wealth that maximizes the wealth of 
the person with the least.160  This seems reasonable if one accepts the 
right assumptions—that people operating in ignorance would want to 
 
 158. Alas, without sufficient empirical evidence, the maximization question may never 
be answered. 
 159. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 160. Id. at 130–39. 
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make sure that if they turn out to be the least well off, then they would 
not be destitute.161  Landes and Posner thus argue that companies would 
agree to allow reverse engineering because of the benefits such a rule 
might bring to everyone in the industry.162 
Professor Bone criticizes contractarian theories in general on the 
grounds that “real world” companies would protest following the 
agreements made during hypothetical negotiations by those who do not 
share their “real world” preferences.163  His argument highlights many of 
the problems with contractarian theory in general, such as that their 
moral force is too dependent on the constraints on hypothetical 
bargaining—especially as those constraints relate to those in the real 
world who would prefer a free market to determine such rules. 
Despite this criticism, one particular set of bargaining constraints 
can shed light on the issue—namely the “veil of ignorance.”  Under the 
veil, the “founders” would not know what position they would occupy, 
and thus the rules they might agree to are determined to be fair and just.  
From a moral standpoint, it is irrelevant what real world people would 
agree to in order for these rules to have normative support.  Because 
debate about rules will always be biased by real world positions, any 
statements about the justification of rules will be biased as well.  The 
goal, however difficult it might be to achieve through thought 
experiments, is to determine what someone might agree to if he or she 
did not know his or her lot in life while making the decision.164 
This leads to a more specific criticism of the veil of ignorance in 
particular—there is no reason to believe that any particular distribution 
of rights associated with trade secrets would be the outcome.165  Why, for 
example, is reverse engineering allowed?  Why is unjust enrichment a 
measure of damages?  Why is improper means broader than common 
law wrongs?  There is no reason to believe that any of the above choices 
should be the outcome, or perhaps all of them could be a just outcome. 
Even if the current set of rules cannot be predicted, veil of ignorance 
analysis is still useful from a normative point of view.  One might be 
 
 161. The assumptions relate to aversion to risk, lottery mentality, and the like. 
 162. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 370.  It is not clear whether this view requires 
the veil of ignorance. 
 163. Bone, supra note 5, at 292–93. 
 164. A further criticism is that these constraints may simply obviate the need for 
hypothetical bargaining in favor of simply determining the proper moral rule and imposing it.  
Even so, it is useful to look at the balancing that one who is self-interested might consider. 
 165. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 5, at 292–93 (discussing KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL 
SECRETS:  EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 57–85 (1988)). 
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able to consider the balancing those in the original position might have 
considered given the current set of rules.  This may be sufficient for 
justifying the existence of trade secret law.  After all, even with 
efficiency analysis we have no way of knowing whether a particular rule 
really is the most efficient in all circumstances.  For example, if one 
assumes that people value that which they create more than others do, 
but at the same time that people want to build on the work of others, it 
is well within the bounds of reason that some form of limited protection 
of trade secrets would be the outcome of a negotiation under the veil of 
ignorance. 
C.  Populist Justification 
A final possible justification of trade secret law is populist support.166  
In short, the majority (or rather the majority’s representatives) in nearly 
all states support some protection through legislation.  For some, this 
might be sufficient justification.  When trade secret law was judge-made 
law, one could dismiss populism or other forms of “public choice” as a 
justification.  Now, however, with so many state legislatures 
independently enacting trade secret statutes, it is pretty clear that trade 
secret law is supported by the masses.167  It may be that the labor value 
theory of trade secrets as property underlies populist support. 
However, the public has in the past (and even currently) supported 
morally repugnant and/or economically inefficient laws.168  Additionally, 
it is not clear that the public in general has an interest in how trade 
secrets are implemented; it is not as if product pricing and corporate 
profits can be directly traced to trade secrets even if secrets may have 
some effect.169  More interesting, then, is determining why it is that 
legislatures choose to have trade secret law.170  After all, there are a 
variety of efficient and morally worthy ideas that never make it into law. 
 
 166. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 15, at 1046. 
 167. But see Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 421 (2002) (discussing the role of interest groups in changing property rights). 
 168. I will not open a can of worms by identifying my nominations for such laws. 
 169. Cent. Transp. Co. v. Pullman’s Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 53 (1891) (stating that 
“the public has no interest in the question by whom [the secret process] is used”); Morse 
Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73, 75 (1869) (“Nor does [restraint of trade] 
extend to a business which is a secret, and not known to the public; because the public has no 
rights in the secret.”). 
 170. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 238–41 
(indicating that it is impossible to determine what the public as a whole wants as social 
choice). 
RISCH ARTICLE   
36 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1 
 
From a political economy point of view, those that have much to 
gain from trade secret law will likely push for its passage, while those 
that do not have an interest will not oppose it.171  Thus, it is no surprise 
that trade secret law was added to the legislative agenda and 
subsequently adopted.172  However, criticism that the current form of 
trade secret law is simply the result of lobbying by powerful companies 
desiring to protect their secrets173 is unfounded for three principal 
reasons.  First, trade secrets are much cheaper to obtain and do not 
grant the absolute exclusive right that patents do.174  As a result, one 
would expect small companies to favor trade secret protection over 
large companies.  In fact, this is the case.175  Second, in general, 
companies have trade secrets and also want to learn the secrets of other 
companies; as a result, one might expect that, in general, “industry” 
would seek to protect trade secrets and that “industry” would also seek 
exceptions for reverse engineering or other methods of learning 
information.176  Third, trade secrets arose from the common law, not the 
political process, and thus their later political acceptance in forty-five 
separate jurisdictions is unlikely to be solely driven by interest groups, 
though those groups obviously had a role in putting trade secrets on the 
agenda. 
Another populist justification for trade secret law is the enforcement 
of commercial ethical standards.177  This justification does not work from 
a utilitarian point of view,178 nor is commercial morality a primary 
component of the philosophical analysis.179  The more likely explanation 
is simply that people do not like bad acts. 
Professor Bone argues that commercial decency is a weak 
justification for trade secrets because there is no empirical evidence to 
support a set of norms in any given industry and there is no reason to 
 
 171. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 407–08. 
 172. RIKER, supra note 170, at 169–96 (control of the agenda leads to control of the 
outcome). 
 173. Michael P. Simpson, Note, The Future of Innovation:  Trade Secrets, Property 
Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1121–22 (2005) 
(“industry” is controlling trade secret law). 
 174. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 357. 
 175. Lerner, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 176. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 366–71. 
 177. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939). 
 178. Bone, supra note 5, at 294–95. 
 179. As discussed below, philosophical support for trade secrets comes from protection 
of the fruits of labor as well as theories about distribution of rights. 
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believe that each industry would choose the present configuration of 
trade secrets in order to enforce those norms.180  This argument does not 
apply, however, when commercial decency is an outgrowth of populism.  
What each industry might like is irrelevant; instead, the public chooses 
to enforce general norms on all industries, regardless of what those 
industries might want.  Such an enforcement of general norms is hardly 
unheard of. 
In the end, as with any other populist theory, whether one accepts 
populism as a justification of trade secrets will primarily depend on 
whether one accepts majority rule as a justification, in general, and 
whether “legitimacy” imparts any sort of moral force.181 
IV.  THE MARGINAL UTILITY OF TRADE SECRETS 
Trade secret law provides (a) protection in addition to contract or 
tort theories, and (b) remedies not offered by the common law.  Thus, 
economic analysis of trade secret law must be confined to trade secret 
law in order to be useful.  In other words, the analysis must be with 
respect to the marginal costs and benefits afforded by trade secret law 
versus the existing common law.  Performing an analysis of trade secrets 
without this distinction can lead to two problems.  First, the task of 
justifying all of tort and contract law, which may underlie trade secrets, 
would take a book,182 not an article.  Second, failing to consider marginal 
costs and benefits may lead to overstatements about the costs and 
benefits of trade secret law, especially in cases where tort and contract 
law are sufficient and confer the same benefits of trade secret law. 
This Part considers the various rights and obligations afforded to 
trade secret owners and asserts that the marginal benefits of trade 
secrets outweigh the marginal costs.  The Appendix provides a detailed 
example of the points discussed. 
A.  Only Some Information May Be Protected 
The determination of what information may be protected is a key to 
understanding how trade secrets differ from underlying law. 
 
 180. Bone, supra note 5, at 294–95. 
 181. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264–80 (Phillips 
Bradley ed., Francis Bowen trans., Vintage Books 1945) (1835) (general discussion of the 
tyranny of the majority). 
 182. In fact, it has.  See POSNER, supra note 13; cf. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 105 
(using common law wrongs as the justification for trade secrets and leaving the duty to 
support that justification to scholars who study those common law wrongs). 
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1.  Economic Value Due to Secrecy 
The requirement that the information have value derived from its 
“secrecy”183 distinguishes trade secrets from the common law.  Neither 
breach of contract nor tort law requires that the subject matter have 
value or that the subject matter not be generally known.184  The 
economic benefits of this are twofold.  First, unlike contract and tort 
law, the plaintiff must be protecting something of value before 
administrative costs are incurred.  Second, and more importantly, 
economic value is a signal to the court that the special rules associated 
with trade secrets are warranted.  Conversely, if the subject matter does 
not have value from secrecy, then remedies such as injunctions would 
impose an unjustified social cost by limiting potentially valuable 
information (though not valuable due to secrecy) from those who could 
use it. 
Critics might argue that trade secret law imposes a cost by keeping 
valuable information from the public,185 which is directly contrary to the 
conventionally understood policies of copyright186 and patent law.  
However, this particular social cost is minimal because the information 
would already be kept secret by the owner in the absence of trade secret 
law while others would attempt to discover the same information 
independently.187  The marginal cost of protecting secret information is 
that those who would use “improper means”188 cannot obtain that 
information and must duplicate innovation.189  This is especially 
 
 183. As noted in Part I, “secrecy” under the statute means that the information is not 
generally known.  A company  keeping information secret means that it does not generally 
publicize or make the information known and, instead, makes attempts to keep others from 
learning the information. 
 184. Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 107 (Me. 2001) (affirming breach of 
contract but denying trade secret information due to lack of value). 
 185. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 139; Simpson, supra note 173, at 1121–22. 
 186. Even copyright applicants can file source code in redacted form as a trade secret.  
37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (2005). 
 187. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490–91 (1974). 
Even were an inventor to keep his discovery completely to himself, something that 
neither the patent nor trade secret laws forbid, there is a high probability that it will 
be soon independently developed.  If the invention, though still a trade secret, is put 
into public use, the competition is alerted to the existence of the inventor’s solution 
to the problem and may be encouraged to make an extra effort to independently 
find the solution thus known to be possible. 
Id. 
 188. By “improper means,” I include the improper use of secret information by 
employees who move to new jobs. 
 189. In the absence of trade secret law, more patent applications would be filed, which 
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pronounced where former employees must “recreate the wheel” or, 
even worse, where employees with experience are not assigned to key 
projects because of the risk of use of confidential information.  As 
discussed below, this marginal cost is likely outweighed by the benefits 
of protection, especially considering the fact that “duplicate innovation” 
or reverse engineering may lead to improvements better than the first 
secret.190 
The discussion thus far has assumed that because the information 
has value to the owner, there should be some protection.  This might not 
necessarily be true; perhaps it would be more efficient if competitors 
could simply take what information they want without repercussion, or 
even if every company were forced to disclose its information.  There 
are bound to be times when the cost of such activity is well justified by 
the value of such secrets, and the competitor might even be able to 
make better use of the information so that society will be better off.  
The subsections below test the alternatives, namely “forced disclosure” 
and “no liability.” 
a.  Forced Disclosure 
It may be that the most efficient rule requires that owners disclose 
all information learned during business operations.  Such disclosure 
would fall into two categories:  low cost and high cost. 
Low cost forced disclosure might include rules that software be 
distributed with its source code191 or rules that competitors be allowed to 
tour factories.  Contrary to the discussion in Part III.A, a low cost forced 
disclosure rule would likely have an impact on incentives to innovate.  
Because others could utilize information cheaply without expending the 
costs of development, owners might receive a much smaller rate of 
return on investment in developing valuable information and thus might 
be less likely to develop such information.  However, with copyright and 
patent protection, the most valuable improvements and writings might 
be protected even if disclosure were forced.  Thus, one would expect 
that the incentive to create otherwise unprotectable information would 
decrease more than the incentive to create information that is otherwise 
 
would exclude all use of the information for a period of time.  Expenditures would then shift 
from duplication to “designing around” patents. 
 190. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (noting 
that reverse engineering allows for significant advancement); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 
6, at 365, 370. 
 191. Indeed, this is a rule implemented by open source software owners. 
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protectable.  The requirement that information have value is a 
“bootstrap” incentive to create secret information.  This is not quite the 
quid pro quo associated with patent filings, but it is nonetheless an 
important societal tradeoff—if you create valuable secret information, 
society will protect it. 
High cost forced disclosure would relate to disclosure of information 
that is not easily shared in a timely manner, such as detailed customer 
information, pricing, product roadmaps, and other ephemeral or 
unwritten information.192  In practice, high cost forced disclosure would 
fail because enforcement and administration costs would be sufficiently 
high that information producers would risk nondisclosure.193  
Additionally, owners would be more likely to keep information in 
memory rather than in writing, which would likely make the 
information less valuable to its owner with no offsetting benefit. 
Further, at the present time, there is no mechanism that would allow 
third parties to determine whether or not a business has developed high 
disclosure cost information and what that information is.  Even factory 
tours might fail to disclose useful information, as secrets might be 
effectively “hidden in plain sight.”194 As a result, lawsuits might be filed 
just to learn whether or not a claim is present.  The outcome would 
likely be either (a) a court system overburdened with so many frivolous 
lawsuits that the meritorious claims might be lost, (b) a world in which 
owners keep information secret anyway, with the hope of not being 
sued, or (c) a series of agreements between competitors in which each 
company agrees not to sue the other.  None of these outcomes are 
particularly palatable from an efficiency point of view, in light of the 
alternatives for developing and learning information. 
Even if all companies followed the rules, the signal to noise ratio 
would probably eliminate all value—indeed, just reaching agreement on 
what is a sufficient disclosure and what system would track disclosures is 
difficult to fathom.  It is possible, of course, that there are a few secrets 
that are difficult or impossible to reverse engineer and that would be 
more valuable if shared.  The cost of “setting free” the vast amount of 
information held by companies but not shared—whether or not they are 
 
 192. It is interesting to note that this information was granted much less protection 
under the Restatement (First) of Torts, but is now given much more protection under the 
UTSA. 
 193. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 118–19. 
 194. Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 683, 698 (1980). 
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trade secrets—would cause so much turmoil that the information might 
still be lost.195 
b.  No Liability 
Even if disclosure were not forced, one could envision a rule where 
companies can maintain secrecy, but also where competitors have no 
liability for using improper means to obtain secrets other than the 
existing common law.  The problem with this rule is twofold.  First, as 
discussed throughout this Part, the common law is insufficient to create 
liability in all cases.  I discuss the failings of tort and common law in 
each subsection, but, in general, liability would be insufficient for those 
not in privity of contract, for certain costly behavior that is not a tort, 
and with respect to remedies.  Furthermore, without clear definitions of 
trade secrets, employee agreements might be interpreted too narrowly, 
allowing employees to escape liability by claiming that information was 
not really “confidential.” 
Second, such a rule might increase the number of transactions as 
well as transaction costs.  Ostensibly, if there were only one competitor 
and one owner, then the owner would either spend more to protect 
information or pay the competitor not to take the secret.  In reality, 
there is usually one secret holder and many competitors who would like 
the information.  The amount of protection would be determined by the 
value of the information to the owner and potential acquirers, the cost 
of protection, and other factors.  For example, the ability to protect 
against employees absconding with information is difficult and costly, 
and the owner would have to choose between inefficient ways to keep 
information from being taken by employees, suing for the limited 
remedies available for breach of contract, or paying the employees more 
than they could gain by absconding. 
Without some added protection, as the number of potential 
competitors increases, the transaction costs of the owner negotiating 
with (or possibly suing for breach of contract) each potential 
misappropriator would be prohibitively high.196  As a result, the owner is 
entitled to keep the value from the trade secret by default rather than 
having to distribute its value by paying others not to take the secret. 
 
 195. For example, a crafty Coca-Cola Company would bury its secret formula in a 
disclosure that also includes the molecular composition of every material used in every 
building in the company. 
 196. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 153, at 766. 
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2.  Requiring No More than Reasonable Efforts to Maintain Secrecy 
The fact that trade secrets may be protected without requiring more 
than reasonable efforts is a primary economic justification for having 
trade secret law.197  Perhaps a better way to state this proposition is that 
the ability to recover damages changes the definition of what is 
reasonable and efficient. 
In the absence of trade secret law, one would expect the efficient 
amount spent on protection of the secret to be the point where the 
marginal cost of protection equals the marginal likelihood of theft or 
accidental disclosure, multiplied by the potential loss after 
misappropriation or accidental loss.198  That is, spending is efficient 
where an extra dollar spent decreases the expected loss by no more and 
no less than a dollar.  Without the protection of trade secret law, the loss 
to the owner will be higher because the loss will include any loss of trade 
secrets, regardless of the reason.199 
With trade secret law, however, potential loss is limited to accidental 
disclosure, undetected misappropriation, and loss due to insufficient 
protection.200  This potential loss is by definition a subset of, and thus 
lower than, the potential loss without trade secret protection.  Thus the 
efficient amount of protection—“reasonable” protection under the 
UTSA—will be lower than if there were no trade secret law.201  Further, 
protection will be more targeted toward detection and prevention of 
accidental disclosure, in addition to protection against “standard” 
attempts at misappropriation. 
 
 197. USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 902 n.12 (Mass. 1979) 
(“‘[I]ndustrial security procedures need to be optimized rather than maximized. Beyond the 
optimum point, the direct and indirect costs of further security outweigh the value of the 
protection.’” (citation omitted)). 
 198. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 366.  This is similar to the Hand 
Formula in negligence actions:  reasonableness = efficient.  Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc v. 
DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Obviously it could have taken more 
precautions.  But at a cost, and the question is whether the additional benefit in security 
would have exceeded that cost.”). 
 199. Some recovery might be possible via other means, but there are marginal benefits 
to trade secret law. 
 200. Additionally, companies will also consider the probability of success in court as 
well as litigation costs in determining how much protection is necessary.  The example in the 
Appendix elucidates this. 
 201. Of course, this is not an exact science—as discussed below, juries will consider the 
circumstances of the alleged misappropriation in determining whether reasonable precautions 
were taken. 
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Thus, ironically, the law of trade secrets is necessary to cause less 
money to be spent on the protection of secrets, and as a result to cause 
less money to be spent by those trying to appropriate someone else’s 
trade secrets, even if that means misappropriation is successful more 
often.  Without a rule protecting trade secret holders even when their 
precautions against improper acquisition or accidental loss are only 
“reasonable,” the amount spent by owners and takers would escalate 
without any corresponding social benefit.202  This is why absolute secrecy 
is not required; the cost of achieving absolute secrecy will often be so 
high that the value of the secret is spent on ensuring that there can be 
no possible accidental disclosure without any corresponding social 
benefit. 
Precautions fall into two categories.  The first category—“standard” 
efforts to exclude and control—is exemplified by physical methods such 
as higher fences, technical methods such as computer passwords, legal 
methods such as nondisclosure agreements, and enforcement/detection 
methods such as security cameras.203  One would expect at least some of 
these measures to be implemented whether or not the law protected 
trade secrets, though the level might vary depending on the value of the 
secret. 
The second category of precautions includes “non-standard” 
measures—precautions where secrecy is enhanced by fragmenting 
information or otherwise failing to trust the standard methods.  These 
methods include only trusting family members, workplace rules that 
limit copying of information to a point where it is much less useful, and 
rules that the secret information may never be completely assembled in 
one place at the same time.  It is with respect to the second category that 
trade secret law most differs from the underlying common law.  For 
example, without trade secret law, owners would have to maximize 
“self-help” protection by obtaining specific confidentiality contracts 
 
 202. Professor Lichtman calls this the “arms race.”  Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights 
on the Frontier:  How the Law Responds to Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 215, 232 (2005); 
see E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Our 
tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the protections required to prevent 
another’s spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened.  Commercial 
privacy must be protected from espionage which could not have been reasonably anticipated 
or prevented.”); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 369 (“A decision in favor of 
Christopher would have induced firms in DuPont’s position to invest heavily in roofing their 
construction sites.”). 
 203. In a world without trade secrets, detection would be limited and focused primarily 
on detecting malfeasance by those entrusted with information under a nondisclosure 
agreement where contractual remedies are available. 
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with every single public official who might learn about the secret in the 
course of work,204 with every vendor who visits the company (including 
each of their employees separately), and so on.  Trade secret law, 
however, implies that certain people are “low risk” for stealing secrets, 
and reasonable precautions might be taken even without a specific 
nondisclosure agreement.205  Contract law alone does not allow for a 
solution to maximize efficiency. 
A real world example illuminates this point.  A client proudly told 
me about how his company’s new development center in China was set 
up to protect trade secrecy:  fingerprint scanners, almost no Internet 
access, expensive network filtering appliances to scan outgoing email, 
special locks on the computers, disabled CD-ROM drives and portable 
drives, extensive physical security, and so forth.  These expensive and 
potentially efficiency-reducing measures are not installed in the United 
States (though here there are other more “standard” precautions).  The 
only difference in the client’s decision making is the perceived inability 
to enforce trade secret rights in China. 
Where only “standard” methods of protection are required, 
competitors will need to spend less to appropriate trade secret 
information.  They might actually succeed more often, but even so, the 
“arms race” escalation will not occur.  Instead, competitors will either:  
(a) spend less money and succeed and avoid detection, (b) spend less 
money and fail or get caught, or (c) not make the attempt due to the 
threat of litigation and damages.206  Each of these outcomes leads to 
more efficient decision making than the alternatives.  The potential for 
damages and deterrence is enough to keep owners from spending more, 
and thus in all events the competitor spends less. 
3.  Requiring at Least Reasonable Efforts to Maintain Secrecy 
Given the desire to avoid wasteful spending on trade secrets, it is 
unclear why the law should require trade secret owners to use 
 
 204. Masonite Corp. v. County of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
639, 648–49 (Ct. App. 1996) (trade secret status not lost where public agency inadvertently 
discloses information); Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 303 A.2d 725, 731 (Conn. 
1972) (citing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868)) (supporting the determination that a 
sheriff and clerk seeing information does not defeat secrecy). 
 205. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding no loss of 
trade secrecy because plaintiff’s competitor, the defendant, did not attend a conference where 
the plaintiff displayed its secret product); Masonite Corp., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648–49; Plastic 
& Metal Fabricators, 303 A.2d at 731. 
 206. Litigation and remedies are discussed below.  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.207  After all, why not just rely on 
the court system and avoid all “wasteful” protection?208  Indeed, the 
“reasonable efforts” requirement seems to impose costs not associated 
with the common law because contract law protecting information does 
not require such efforts, nor does tort law.209 
However, requiring some efforts to maintain secrecy does serve a 
purpose.  Consider the definition of “efficient” above; the marginal cost 
of protection equals marginal change in likelihood multiplied by the 
potential loss.  In the absence of trade secret law, one might expect 
efficient/reasonable precautions to be spent in any event.  Trade secret 
law attempts to force this same optimization by requiring efficient 
protection measures; to the extent it succeeds, the marginal effect of this 
requirement is close to zero—with or without trade secret law, the same 
amount would be spent on protection. 
Given this baseline, granting protection where less than 
“reasonable” precautions are taken might confer a social benefit due to 
less spending by owners.  However, without the requirement, trade 
secret owners would under-protect information in some instances, 
perhaps even strategically. This could have costly consequences.  If the 
misappropriator is a repeat offender, willing to gather information from 
whatever sources are available, then requiring those with more valuable 
secrets to use reasonable precautions might shift appropriation efforts 
to a path of lesser resistance and ostensibly lesser harm if the 
appropriator is successful.210  If the appropriator’s effort is shifted to 
public information, for which there is no harm, then the entire cost of 
the misappropriation efforts might be avoided.211 
Also, the reasonable precautions requirement is a signal and 
potential proxy for the fact-finder to determine that the trade secret has 
value and that it is in fact secret.212  This reduces administrative costs; 
 
 207. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 194, at 698.  This explicit rule is part of the definition 
under the UTSA; it was less emphasized under the Restatement, though it was still one of the 
factors considered with respect to whether the information was “secret.” 
 208. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal 
Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV 307 (2006) (a precautions requirement may shift 
crime to those who take fewer precautions). 
 209. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 153, at 769 (property rule not requiring fences is 
efficient). 
 210. See Mikos, supra note 208, at 343. 
 211. One would, of course, have to consider any additional development costs of the 
appropriator if the information is not as helpful. 
 212. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“Under the second theory of trade secret protection, the owner’s precautions still have 
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rather than having to analyze detailed information about the special 
value a secret might have as compared to whether it is public, which 
might be difficult even for trained economists, fact-finders can infer that 
the secret must have had some value or the owner would not have spent 
money to keep it secret.213  Unfortunately, the value of this signal is 
mixed, primarily because reasonable precautions are a jury question, 
and ex ante, an owner may not know if the jury will agree with the level 
of precautions to be asserted.214 
Furthermore, if owners are not required to expend reasonable 
precautions, then owners could sue in order to seek compensation when 
the information is disclosed inadvertently, or by those who are unaware 
that the owner considers the information secret.  In some cases, this 
would cause an in terrorem effect215 that might limit the use of otherwise 
publicly available information or force settlements that simply shift 
wealth with no societal benefit.  In other cases, this would allow rent-
seeking that would unnecessarily increase administrative costs without 
any offsetting benefit to society.216 
For the most part, however, the requirement of reasonable 
precautions would likely not change any behavior—if litigation is more 
 
evidentiary significance, but now primarily as evidence that the secret has real value.”); 
Lichtman, supra note 202, at 226–27; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 368 (only 
trade secret owners know what they consider secret, and thus have the burden of identifying 
secrets by showing that they protected against accidental loss). 
 213. This also leads to interplay with “improper means,” which is discussed below.  See 
discussion infra Part IV.B.1.  But see Kitch, supra note 194, at 698 (simply bringing the suit 
implies that the owner thinks the secret is valuable).  Of course, there are many reasons why 
an owner might bring suit, so investment in protecting the secret helps sort legitimate 
purposes from illegitimate purposes. 
 214. Even so, the buildup of case law over time gives some idea about the proper level 
of protection.  Publication in a newspaper is a bad idea; obtaining nondisclosure agreements 
from employees and telling them what the owner considers secret is a good idea.  The 
margins are more difficult, but, as discussed below, the more the competitor spends to 
appropriate the secret, the more likely a jury will find reasonable precautions. 
 215. Kitch, supra note 194, at 698–99 (suggesting that such efforts are useful to let 
employees know what the employer considers secret, so that the employer cannot “foil the 
policy of free movement of employees unless confined to information that the employer has 
shown a consistent and meaningful desire to protect”). 
 216. See, e.g., Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 179. 
If Rockwell expended only paltry resources . . . why should the law, whose 
machinery is far from costless, bother to provide Rockwell with a remedy? . . . The 
remedial significance of such efforts lies in the fact that if the plaintiff has allowed 
his trade secret to fall into the public domain, he would enjoy a windfall if permitted 
to recover damages merely because the defendant took the secret from him, rather 
than from the public domain as it could have done with impunity. 
Id. 
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expensive than “standard” precautions, then owners will exercise those 
precautions anyway.217 
Of course, it would be most optimal to not require (or need) any 
efforts to maintain secrecy and rely on competitors to follow the law,218 
but as long as there is a chance that a competitor could avoid detection, 
then some protection must be required either in law or in practice.219  
Further, as Professor Chiappetta points out, the existence of trade secret 
law causes spending on protection to shift more toward detection.220  
This has the added benefit of providing notice to potential appropriators 
that (a) they will likely be caught in the attempt, and (b) if they are 
caught, the owner will enforce his or her rights. 
An interesting complication of this analysis is that, unlike negligence 
theory, it is the behavior of the “victim” and not the behavior of the 
“wrongdoer” that is primarily relevant.  This hearkens to the law of 
contributory negligence, moral hazard, and insurance;221 the potential 
victim is required to try to avoid the loss in order to recover for harm 
caused by the defendant.  Where there is a substantial risk of under-
protection against an insured loss, a requirement of efficient protection 
will help avoid that risk. 
 
 217. Of course, one would expect most owners to do this on their own, especially given 
litigation costs.  Lichtman, supra note 202, at 228 (“No sense in hiring a lawyer when a simple 
fence will do!”). 
 218. Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 178 (“The first [conception of trade secrets] emphasizes the 
desirability of deterring efforts that have as their sole purpose and effect the redistribution of 
wealth from one firm to another.”); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 153, at 768–69. 
 219. This leads to a related question:  Why not just let the competitor take the trade 
secrets anyway?  That might yield the optimal result.  Assuming the owner implements 
reasonable protection, this is not optimal.  Assuming there is no protection, the trade secret 
law does, in fact, allow this result by denying trade secret protection. 
 220. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 111.  This also provides a response to Professor Bone’s 
assertion that trade secret laws are not providing the optimal amount of deterrence, as 
evidenced by the growing amount of trade secret theft and litigation.  Bone, supra note 5, at 
274.  It may very well be that detection efforts have improved and that departing employees 
(arguably the largest class of potential misappropriators) have underestimated this 
improvement (or think they can avoid it).   Further, if trade secret law incentivizes less 
spending on protection, then one might expect appropriators to succeed more often, even if 
some misappropriation is detected. 
 221. David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary 
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37–40 (1990) (discussing the problem of eager victims); 
Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. 
REV. 313, 341–42 (1990) (discussing variable insurance pricing for moral hazard problems); 
see also Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 133 (discussing accidental disclosure and the last clear 
chance and justifying liability for acquirers who had reason to know of accidental disclosure). 
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4.  Non-Continuous Use 
Another requirement that might be difficult to justify is the UTSA’s 
rejection of the rule that trade secrets be in continuous use in order to 
have protection.  Under the Restatement, a party was required to use a 
trade secret in order to maintain an action for misappropriation, similar 
to trademark law.222  The old rule follows the post-Masland unfair 
competition theory of trade secrets—in order to obtain benefit from the 
law then one must be using the information in commerce.  The 
economic rationale for the old rule is that one cannot “tie up” 
information in commerce that is not being used by the owner.  If the 
original owner of the information was not using it, then any party would 
be able to use the information without liability, despite the means used 
to learn it.  Departing employees best exemplify this issue—they might 
depart with information that is no longer being used without risk of 
trade secret liability or injunction.  Contract damages would be low as 
well because the value of unused information is low.  One might prefer 
this outcome to expenditures for independent development, reverse 
engineering, or transaction costs for a license. 
How then is a rule that excludes ex-employees (and others) from 
taking advantage of otherwise unused information efficient?  The 
answer lies in the requirement that the secret have independent 
economic value from not being generally known.223  It is quite possible 
for information to have value “on the shelf” of one company but kept 
away from competitors.  A market leader, for example, might create a 
trade secret manufacturing process, and then later create an even better 
process.  Even though it is using the new process, the company would 
not want its competitors using the old process in competition.224 
There are four reasons the new rule creates social value.  First, the 
fact that a company has developed new and better secret information 
means that the old information was not as valuable.  As such, allowing 
competitors to acquire and use “second best” information through 
improper means225 does not necessarily outweigh wasteful costs 
associated with protecting and obtaining the information.226  Second, 
 
 222. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
 223. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (Supp. 
2006). 
 224. Courtesy Temp. Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 225. The owner would still keep “on the shelf” information secret in the absence of 
trade secret protection. 
 226. These costs are discussed in detail below.  See infra Part IV.D. 
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stopping competitors from using “second best” information creates an 
incentive for the competitor to innovate and independently find the 
“best” information, or even improve on the original information.  Third, 
this rule encourages the trade secret owner to continue to innovate 
because it removes a disincentive to further research, namely the chance 
that a competitor might gain value from the old secret if usage stops.  
Fourth, it may be that the trade secret owner may want to use the 
information in the future. 
Consider as an illustration Coca-Cola Company’s switch to New 
Coke in 1985.227  While the trademark was protected through a variety of 
merchandise and use on other soft drink products around the world, the 
“secret formula” for Coca-Cola was no longer in use.228  Under the 
Restatement view, Coca-Cola would have lost trade secret rights in the 
formula, which could have proved disastrous for Coca-Cola had its 
security measures not been effective.  Each of the four efficiency effects 
discussed above is present.  First, allowing PepsiCo to infiltrate Coca-
Cola and lawfully take the formula for Coca-Cola just because the 
formula was not in use would have caused Coca-Cola to implement 
even more security measures than it already does.  Second, if PepsiCo 
had been able to sell a Coke flavored drink, then PepsiCo might have 
ceased the research that brought Crystal Pepsi and Pepsi ONE to the 
world.  Third, the ability to keep the old formula as a trade secret 
encouraged Coca-Cola to innovate by creating the formula for New 
Coke.229  Fourth, and most important by far, given the fact that Coca-
Cola Classic was later marketed using the original formula, continued 
protection during the temporary non-use of the “secret formula” makes 
sense. 
B.  Liability Only Accrues Under Limited Circumstances 
In addition to the definition of trade secrets, certain prerequisites 
must be met before a competitor can be liable for trade secret 
misappropriation. 
 
 227. The Coca-Cola Company, Heritage, Coke Lore, http://www2.coca-cola.com/ 
heritage/cokelore_newcoke.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
 228. Assume for purposes of illustration that the same formula is not used anywhere in 
the world.  This may be an accurate assumption as Coca-Cola is flavored differently in many 
countries. 
 229. While many might not call New Coke an improvement, a formula similar to New 
Coke is still sold in many places as Coke II.  Coca-Cola, supra note 227. 
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1.  The Use of Improper Means 
In order to hold a defendant liable for misappropriation, that 
defendant must have used “improper means” to obtain the information, 
where such improper means includes torts, breaches of contract and 
other confidentiality duties, and non-tort espionage.230  Conversely, if 
someone obtains information in good faith or independent research, 
then there can be no misappropriation.  As discussed throughout this 
Article, improper means goes beyond wrongdoing that is only 
actionable at common law.231  Examples of such activity are the flyover 
in Christopher,232 dumpster diving,233 and surveillance by electronic 
means without trespass.234  The economic question is what social value 
the “improper means” test adds that would not otherwise be available at 
common law. 
One important result of the improper means test is the extension of 
trade secret liability to third parties who would otherwise not be liable 
under the common law, either due to lack of wrongdoing or lack of 
intentional tort.235  Indeed, this was the very issue in the Peabody case—
a third party wanted to use the secret information delivered by someone 
under contract with the plaintiff.236  If third parties are not held liable, 
then wasteful overprotection is more likely to occur.  Owners will 
 
 230. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (Supp. 2006).  
This includes defendants who had “reason to know” that the information was improper.  Id. 
 231. See Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 145 (trade secret law protects more breaches of 
confidentiality duty than just contract, and breach of contract should be considered a “lesser 
included” offense); see also Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 463 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(discussing different confidential relationships arising by operation of law). 
 232. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 233. See, e.g., Silvaco Data Sys. v. Tech. Modeling Assocs., 896 F. Supp. 973, 974 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
 234. Such surveillance may violate other statutes, such as section 632 of the California 
Penal Code, which criminalizes eavesdropping or recording of private communications.  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1999).  Without trade secret law, violations of this statute might 
not be fully recompensed. 
 235. Third-party involvement is relatively common.  Professor Bone argues that breach 
of contract, in combination with interference with contract, is sufficient to cover nearly all 
trade secret misappropriations.  Bone, supra note 5, at 303.  Unfortunately, application of 
interference with contract is not as clear.  First, constructive knowledge is not sufficient for 
liability, and the actions must be intended to disrupt the relationship, which may be difficult 
given that the employee has usually left employment by the time of any wrongdoing.  Blank 
v. Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 70 (Cal. 1985).  Second, the competitor may not know about 
confidentiality obligations.  See, e.g., DSC Commc’n Corp. v. Pulse Commc’n, Inc., 170 F.3d 
1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (improper means is a jury question where defendant acquired 
information while visiting a third party). 
 236. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 461 (1868). 
RISCH ARTICLE  
2007] WHY DO WE HAVE TRADE SECRETS? 51 
 
increase protection and use potentially inefficient means (such as only 
allowing family members to work for the company).  Also, third-party 
competitors would be more likely to engage in costly bribes to those 
who violate their common law duties (such as employees), because the 
competitor would not have to pay the consequences of the action and 
the employee may be judgment-proof. 
Additionally, the common law may not fully recompense trade 
secret owners, causing the same wasteful incentives.  For example, 
conversion is preempted as to trade secret information,237 and damages 
for conversion only cover the physical value of the item stolen rather 
than the information on that item.238  Similarly, trade secret owners 
might have trouble proving full “expectation damages” or obtaining an 
injunction for breach of a nondisclosure agreement where the defendant 
claims that damages should be limited to the cost of recreating 
information.239  If trade secret owners are under-compensated, they are 
likely to increase spending on protection against misappropriation 
beyond an efficient level.240 
The above analysis does not address why otherwise legal actions 
should be considered improper means.  The answer again is an incentive 
against waste.  Although a method of discovering a secret may be legal, 
it may still be costly and thus discouraged.  Trade secret law discourages 
more than actionable behavior—it discourages wasteful behavior that 
would otherwise not be actionable.  By allowing for damages despite the 
use of legal means, competitors internalize the options; if it is truly 
cheaper (including damages) for a company to use a costly but legal 
means to learn information rather than independently develop it, then it 
should do so, and society will be better off. 
While reverse engineering and independent development may also 
be costly, those methods do not lead to an escalation of the cost of 
protecting against such legal methods.  The reason is that companies 
cannot spend money to stop independent development, and they will 
 
 237. Tronitec, Inc. v. Shealy, 547 S.E.2d 749, 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); see also Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other 
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 238. See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys. v. Nellcor Puritan-Bennett, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 
1258, 1263 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (damages for theft of disks and manuals limited only to value of 
physical object, not information therein). 
 239. That is, defendants would claim that the “expectation” for the nondisclosure 
agreement is not the full value of the information (or loss thereof), but rather the value 
associated with the head start of a competitor. 
 240. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 153, at 768–69. 
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spend money to thwart reverse engineering whether or not trade secret 
law exists.  One might argue that outlawing reverse engineering might 
stop escalation of efforts to hide designs or to reverse engineer, but the 
result of such a rule is indeterminate.  To the extent reverse engineering 
is difficult to detect, companies would continue to try to thwart efforts.  
There would also be little effect for those companies that cannot hide 
their product design.  Also, many of the benefits of reverse engineering, 
such as advances based on improving the work of others, would be lost. 
Finally, “improper means” is a signal to the fact-finder regarding 
both the value of the trade secret and the reasonable efforts of the trade 
secret owner.  The higher the cost of the improper means, the more 
likely that the information is valuable, was the subject of reasonable 
efforts to remain secret, and was not independently developed.241  
Otherwise, a competitor would not spend so much trying to discover the 
secret.  The effect of this signal is that the likelihood of prevailing 
increases the more a competitor spends (assuming the competitor is 
discovered).  An increased likelihood of a plaintiff prevailing decreases 
the expected value of such activity for the competitor, and thus is an 
incentive against wasteful escalation of espionage and an incentive for 
alternative reverse engineering or independent research.  This effect 
further increases the likelihood that the trade secret owner will be fully 
compensated for any loss, decreasing the incentive for wasteful 
protection measures. 
2.  Determining How the Competitor Obtained the Information 
The requirement that a trade secret not be readily ascertainable242 
and the related rule that reverse engineering is not necessarily improper 
means243 are important parts of trade secret law. 
 
 241. Professor Lichtman calls reasonable precautions circumstantial evidence that any 
taking must have been improper or the competitor would not have succeeded.  Lichtman, 
supra note 202, at 226–27; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 
174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The greater the precautions that Rockwell took to maintain the 
secrecy of the piece part drawings, the lower the probability that DEV obtained them 
properly and the higher the probability that it obtained them through a wrongful act; the 
owner had taken pains to prevent them from being obtained otherwise.”); LANDES & 
POSNER, supra note 6, at 357. 
 242. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (Supp. 2006).  
Technically, the value of the trade secret must be that it is not readily ascertainable.  Readily 
ascertainable should be distinguished from reverse engineering.  It may be quite difficult to 
determine a trade secret through reverse engineering—one would not want to negate the 
trade secrecy in those situations.  See the discussion below relating to California’s omission of 
“non-readily ascertainable” from the definition of a trade secret. 
 243. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  Reverse engineering might be barred if 
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a.  Reverse Engineering and Independent Discovery 
The ability to independently discover or reverse engineer 
information would be available without trade secret law, and thus the 
costs and benefits of such activity are not materially changed by 
protection of trade secrets.244  This right creates social benefits caused by 
broader access to valuable but unpatented information.245  Furthermore, 
it is an activity that can create positive externalities.246 
Finally, Landes and Posner argue that if reverse engineering is 
allowed but acquisition by improper means is not, then owners will 
spend less on protecting against improper means.247  Because 
competitors can reverse engineer, protection against theft has a lower 
benefit, so expenditures on protection will be lower.  Even so, this effect 
might be mitigated if owners use costly technical measures to make 
reverse engineering difficult.  However, the UTSA’s allowance of 
reverse engineering has little marginal effect on technical measures to 
stop reverse engineering.  Even without trade secret law, companies 
have an incentive to thwart reverse engineering.  So long as reverse 
engineering is legal, 248 the addition of trade secret law makes a 
difference only in those cases where “snooping” is cheaper than reverse 
engineering.  The full effect is difficult to measure; however, without 
trade secret law information owners would spend more to prevent 
 
the competitor steals the device to be analyzed or if a party breaches a contract in which 
reverse engineering is prohibited.  Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 108 (Me. 2001); 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (“The acquisition of the known product must, of course, 
also be by a fair and honest means, such as purchase of the item on the open market . . . .”). 
 244. One exception might be administrative costs associated with litigation where 
parties have a contractual relationship but one party independently develops information.  
The cost of proving independent development might impose a social cost, but even this cost 
might occur without trade secret law, as the owner would sue for breach of contract. 
 245. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 361 (noting that the first to patent a new 
innovation gets exclusive use despite duplicative efforts, while discovery of trade secret 
innovation does not mean that parallel efforts by others will go to waste). 
 246. Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 178 (“This difference in treatment is not explained, but it 
may rest on the twofold idea that reverse engineering involves the use of technical skills that 
we want to encourage, and that anyone should have the right to take apart and to study a 
product that he has bought.”).  But see Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 130–31 (discussing various 
factors that reduce the positive externalities of reverse engineering). 
 247. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 367–68. 
 248. This Article does not consider contracts that bar reverse engineering as they are a 
matter for further research.  However, to the extent that anti-reverse engineering contracts 
are enforced, then costs of technical measures to stop reverse engineering will go down.  
However, to the extent that such contracts are difficult to enforce, then self-help costs will go 
down much less.  The effect on access costs is indeterminate; the answer largely depends on 
the quality of self-help, deterrent effect of contracts, and the costs of enforcement. 
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appropriation efforts, making “snooping” more expensive in 
comparison to reverse engineering. 
b.  Readily Ascertainable 
The “not readily ascertainable” factor is part of the definition of a 
trade secret in most states, but that factor should be considered an 
exception to misappropriation of trade secrets; this is the more efficient 
rule.  For example, under California law, the fact that information is 
readily ascertainable is a defense, but only if the competitor actually 
“readily ascertained” the information through independent means.249  In 
other words, if one trespasses to obtain information or is a departing 
employee, it is not a defense that someone else could have easily 
discovered the information by independent research.250 
An example might be helpful.  Suppose an employee absconds with 
a customer list that is otherwise secret.  Further, assume that one could 
easily look in the yellow pages (or use an Internet search engine) to find 
out the same names of potential customers who would be interested in 
the product.  In most states, the employee would not be liable because 
the list would not be a trade secret—the information is “readily 
ascertainable.”  In California, however, the employee would be liable 
because he or she did not actually perform the independent research, 
but instead misappropriated the list.251 
This distinction is important.  The California rule outlaws efforts to 
appropriate information from the trade secret owner even if someone 
else could have cheaply learned the secret.  This reduces the incentive 
for the owner to overprotect information when it is uncertain about how 
expensive it would be for a competitor to recreate the same 
information.252  Further, this is an efficient burden shifting mechanism 
that enhances the incentive for competitors to research where it is 
 
 249. Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d  279, 286–87 (Ct. App. 2003); 
ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 529 n.9 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 250. Compare this to the UTSA form of the rule:  the trespasser is not liable if the 
information is easily discovered. 
 251. These are the basic facts of ABBA Rubber Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. 518. 
 252. This is not to say that the competitor has no choice; misappropriating readily 
ascertainable information causes a wealth transfer from the owner to the competitor with no 
corresponding social benefit.  If the competitor must pay damages, then the competitor can 
decide whether it is less costly to do independent research or whether it is less costly to 
appropriate otherwise secret (but easily duplicated) information, so long as it also pays the 
owner.  Thus, the rule treats secret but readily ascertainable information just like any other 
information, so that the owner does not have to take different protection measures for 
different types of information. 
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inexpensive to do so instead of expending resources on appropriation 
activities that are otherwise disfavored.253 
The California rule also reduces litigation costs and uncertainty 
relating to litigation.  The misappropriator that would be liable under 
California’s rule, by definition, has not done the independent research; 
even so, the defense of “readily ascertainable” is often asserted only 
after a lawsuit is filed.  If litigation has commenced, the California rule 
bypasses extensive discovery, trial time, expert costs, and other 
administrative costs associated with the plaintiff proving a negative, 
namely that the information is not readily ascertainable.  Instead, the 
defendant is liable if he or she did not actually do the research but 
instead used improper means to obtain the information.  This is a bright 
line rule in favor of re-creation if such re-creation is inexpensive rather 
than leaving matters uncertain—whether something is “readily 
ascertainable” is a question of fact. 
The alternate view is that the California rule unfairly prejudges guilt 
where information has little value in secrecy.  Under this view, if the 
information is readily ascertainable then there should be no liability for 
appropriating it (even by improper means) because the value of the 
information is low, meaning there are no effects on the incentive to 
innovate.  The argument continues that the California rule privatizes 
easily findable information and it is unfair and costly for competitors to 
be sued over such information.  The “prejudgment” is that the 
competitor is liable if he or she did not happen to keep good records. 
For example, Professor Chiappetta agrees that the California rule 
should apply to “bad acts,” but, with respect to voluntary disclosures to 
those with a duty of confidentiality (for example, employees or 
production partners), he argues that the owner should make an 
investigation and have a bona fide belief that the information is not 
available elsewhere.254  The argument is that if the information is 
available elsewhere, then the owner may not “privatize” the information 
just because the information is being disclosed in a business transaction.  
Instead, Professor Chiappetta argues that the owner must really believe 
 
 253. It is true that this rule means it will be more difficult for the recipient to show that 
information was discovered elsewhere rather than misappropriated, but the cost of proof at 
trial in the few cases where this is an issue would be offset by the costs of owners trying to 
determine what information might be available elsewhere when deciding what information 
they want to protect. 
 254. Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 121–29, 149.  This proposal also rejects the current 
UTSA rule barring protection for information that is readily ascertainable. 
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that the recipient cannot readily obtain the information elsewhere if 
trade secret protection is to apply. 
The distinction between “bad acts” and “voluntary disclosure” 
seems unnecessary with respect to whether or not a misappropriator 
who fails to do independent research can be held liable for taking 
information that is otherwise easily discovered.  The fact that the owner 
takes reasonable precautions (including negotiating a nondisclosure 
agreement) implies that the owner believes the material is not readily 
ascertainable elsewhere.  Therefore, requiring the owner to perform a 
search to prove a negative (that the information is not readily 
ascertainable) would be wasteful.  Instead, it should be the acquirer who 
must object to confidentiality restrictions on information that he or she 
believes is readily ascertainable.  While simple research might be 
duplicated unnecessarily, there is no reason to believe that such costs 
are greater than the costs associated with an owner doing research to 
prove a negative and then document it at the time of agreement. 
From a transaction costs point of view this makes sense as well.  
Consider the thousands and thousands of confidentiality agreements 
that companies enter into annually.  Consider as well the volume of 
secret information created by employees after signing a non-disclosure 
agreement.  Only in a small fraction of those cases will the recipient 
want to use the information it receives for purposes outside that 
relationship.  In contrast, the cost of determining whether every single 
piece of information created is readily ascertainable would be quite 
large, if not boundless.  Thus, ex ante rule making will yield more 
efficient outcomes if, in a few cases, an information recipient is required 
to take steps to document independent research in a few cases rather 
than if, in every case, information owners are required to complete 
exhaustive searches for all public domain information that might be 
disclosed without regard to how the recipient might use such 
information.   
Professor Chiappetta’s analysis also seems to assume that if the 
supposedly confidential information is available elsewhere, then the 
consideration255 for trade secret protection would fail.256  This view does 
not necessarily enhance efficiency.  Nondisclosure agreements are tied 
to production contracts, evaluation contracts, employment contracts, 
 
 255. Id.  Professor Chiappetta calls this the quid pro quo that allows the holder to 
leverage confidential information into higher value.  Id. at 122–23. 
 256. Id. at 122–23.  Professor Chiappetta argues that breach of contract might still 
apply, but not the additional remedies associated with trade secret misappropriation.  Id. 
RISCH ARTICLE  
2007] WHY DO WE HAVE TRADE SECRETS? 57 
 
and other value added arrangements, whether implied or express.  In 
other words, trade secrets are usually disclosed for reasons other than 
simply obtaining the information.  If a recipient needs the information 
to reach its goals (say, a salary or a production contract), then the 
recipient would agree to protect the confidential information of the 
owner, whether or not the same information could be “pieced together” 
elsewhere at a lesser cost.257  If the recipient believes that the 
information can be ascertained elsewhere, then he or she can either 
refuse to enter the contract, or at some later date can “ascertain” the 
information without liability.258  This does not mean that the recipient 
should be able to use the information it receives without trade secret 
liability simply because the owner did not first verify that the 
information was not available elsewhere. 
As such, it does not make economic sense to place the burden on the 
owner to research whether information might be readily ascertainable 
elsewhere, nor does it make sense to allow someone who enters into a 
contract with the owner to use secret information in breach of a duty 
simply because some third party might be able to easily compile the 
information.259  Placing the burden on the recipient does not “privatize” 
the information; it merely forces the recipient to abide by the covenants 
that were given to obtain contractual benefits in the first place. 
 
 257. Consider, for example, ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, which 
requires that an attorney keep confidential all information learned in the course of 
representation, whether or not privileged.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 
(2003). The burden of this rule on the attorney is a cost of obtaining the fee for 
representation, and it is irrelevant whether someone else might discover the same 
information elsewhere. 
 258. The owner may have uncertainty that leads to litigation, but there is no reason why 
readily ascertainable information cannot be excluded from an agreement in advance if it is 
truly readily ascertainable. 
 259. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 953, 963 
(2005). 
ProCD offers $100 to anyone who brings it a phone book it does not already have.  
E sends in a book. Must ProCD pay?  Of course it must—even though the phone 
book is in the public domain, E has created an economic benefit by bringing it to 
ProCD’s attention.  Information is not free—indeed ignorance is rampant—so we 
enforce contracts that traffic in ‘public domain’ information. 
Id. 
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C.  Enforcement and Remedies 
1.  Loss to the Owner 
Compensating the trade secret owner for the lost value associated 
with the trade secret is the critical mechanism that encourages reduced 
expenditures on prevention and appropriation.260  The economic 
mechanism is relatively simple—the reimbursement of loss261 increases 
the expected value (by decreasing the expected loss) of the owner to a 
point where the owner will be less likely to spend more on protection.  
Because any loss is likely insured, the diminishing effectiveness of 
spending on protection measures would no longer be optimal. 
Similarly, the potential that the competitor will have to compensate 
the owner lowers the expected value of the appropriation activity.  
Because of this, alternatives that do not include the risk of damages 
liability look more attractive. 
2.  Unjust Enrichment 
The UTSA also allows for the recovery of the misappropriator’s 
profits, so long as the amounts are in addition to the owner’s loss.262  
Unjust enrichment is not typically available for breach of contract.263 
Mark Lemley is an outspoken opponent to such damages in the 
context of intellectual property; he argues that the incentive to create is 
maximized so long as actual losses are paid, and disgorging additional 
benefits to the plaintiff in addition to that is unnecessary to create 
incentives.264  While this argument might apply to patents and 
copyrights, it does not fit as well with trade secrets.  As discussed above, 
the incentives associated with trade secrecy are to allocate fewer 
resources to protection and appropriation of secret information.265 
 
 260. The effect of litigation costs, detection costs, and likelihood of success are 
considered below.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 261. More technically, this is the chance of reimbursement upon successful litigation, 
assuming that a competitor is successful at appropriating the secret. 
 262. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 633–34 (Supp. 2006). 
 263. A-C Compressor Corp. v. Zeno, No. 96-0620, 1996 WL 737299 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
27, 1996) (unjust enrichment damages available on contract only if the information at issue 
qualifies as a trade secret); see also Hill, supra note 8, at 13–15 (discussing the difference 
between expectation damages and unjust enrichment).  But see Celeritas Techs. v. Rockwell 
Int’l, 150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (contract damages higher than trade secret damages, and 
plaintiff must elect remedies), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1106 (1999). 
 264. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1068. 
 265. There are, of course, incentives to disclose the trade secret as well; such incentives 
are associated with patent protection in exchange for disclosure.  See generally LANDES & 
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Because the economic justification of trade secrets differs from the 
justification for patents and copyrights, disgorging unjust enrichment is 
important.  If the competitor values the secret in an amount more than 
the owner will lose or if the court undervalues the amount of the 
owner’s loss, then the competitor will have an incentive to spend more 
on appropriation.  In turn, this will cause the owner to spend more on 
protection than it otherwise might need to if it had the remedy, leading 
to the same “arms race” without a commensurate gain in expected 
social value.266  Thus, the law disgorges the additional benefit in order to 
reduce the competitor’s incentive to focus more resources on 
appropriation. 
3.  Attorneys’ Fees 
The UTSA provides for attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff for willful 
misappropriation.267  In the economic terms discussed in this Article, the 
likelihood of fee shifting will increase as the amount the competitor 
spends on appropriation increases.  The marginal effect of this rule is 
that competitors will have another incentive not to escalate 
appropriation efforts. 
4.  Injunction 
The trade secret injunction is the primary basis for “exclusivity” of a 
secret.  Injunctions are difficult to obtain in contract cases.268  It is not by 
chance that injunctions are the last remedy discussed here; if 
transaction, administrative, and enforcement costs are zero, and if all 
parties have perfect information, then all parties would be indifferent 
 
POSNER, supra note 6, at 328–29 (discussing that patent law’s economic value is in large part 
convincing inventors to share inventions rather than keep them secret, as well as reducing 
costs of licensing innovation). 
 266. Any social gain due to the competitor’s larger value on the secret will be offset, in 
large part, by the probability of detection and loss at trial, in addition to administrative and 
enforcement costs such as attorneys’ fees. 
 267. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4.  The UTSA also provides for punitive damages 
for willful misappropriation and fee shifting to the defendant for bad faith claims.  Id. §§ 3–4.  
These remedies are not addressed here, though punitive damages will tend to create the same 
incentives that fee shifting will create.  They might also create the risk of over litigation, 
though the fee shifting risk for frivolous litigation counters this somewhat. 
 268. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897, 903 (Minn. 
1983) (no injunction or other relief under employee nondisclosure agreements where plaintiff 
could not prove trade secrecy with reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy); Bone, supra note 
5, at 282 (noting that contract enforcement against companies hiring ex-employees is likely to 
be insufficient). 
RISCH ARTICLE   
60 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1 
 
between damages (a liability rule) and an injunction (a property rule).269  
However, in the real world parties do not have perfect information, and 
there are transaction costs. 
First, an injunction would be necessary to keep the defendant from 
disclosing the secret to anyone else, thus enhancing the potential loss or 
even destroying the trade secret altogether.270 
Second, if one expects that courts might undervalue the damages 
(especially given the cost of ascertaining damages), then an injunction 
rule would be necessary.271  Additionally, if the damages are potentially 
uncollectible, then an injunction would add an additional disincentive to 
overprotect secrets.272  Also, to the extent that an owner might negotiate 
with potential parties for licenses, the availability of an injunction will 
allow for better definition of rights.273  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, trade secret misappropriation is ongoing—a pure liability 
rule would require the owner to seek damages on a regular basis,274 
causing extremely wasteful enforcement and administration costs simply 
to transfer wealth from one party to another.275 
Returning to the question that opened this Article, irreparable 
injury should be assumed for the purposes of a permanent injunction.  
The trade secret statute acknowledges this and does not require a 
showing of irreparable injury.276  An owner may otherwise have 
 
 269. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 153, at 763. 
 270. DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192 (Ct. App. 2004) (no 
trade secret where widespread dissemination, even if wrongful, destroyed secrecy). 
 271. Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1974) (“It is precisely because 
damages are so difficult to show that injunctive relief becomes a favored remedy.”); Kaplow 
& Shavell, supra note 153, at 768–69. 
 272. But see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 153, at 770 (stating that collection risk is not 
a factor if failure to pay a judgment means return of property).  Analogized to trade secrets, 
the risk of ongoing damage for continued use of trade secrets and failure to pay a judgment is 
low where the misappropriator is out of business. 
 273. Id. at 767 (noting that a property rule does not create incentive for “takers” to 
negotiate, but does create incentive and reduce transaction costs for owners to negotiate). 
 274. It is unlikely in the real world that all future potential damages for ongoing 
damages could be measured at an initial trial, especially if the competitor were to later share 
the information with others.  See, e.g., Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511–12 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (calculation of loss of goodwill is inherently difficult, such that assumption of 
irreparable injury is appropriate). 
 275. But see Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 156–57 (fashioning and enforcing injunctions 
may cost society too much in administrative costs). 
 276. Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 57 P.3d 647 (Cal. 2002).  Other 
areas of intellectual property do not require evidence of irreparable injury.  Taylor Corp. v. 
Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 968 (2005) (“Taylor certainly has the right to 
control the use of its copyrighted materials, and irreparable harm inescapably flows from the 
RISCH ARTICLE  
2007] WHY DO WE HAVE TRADE SECRETS? 61 
 
difficulty proving irreparable injury since, after all, the owner could visit 
the courthouse on an annual basis in order to prove damages on an 
ongoing basis or could obtain a royalty.277  Thus, except in extreme cases, 
an injunction is a mechanism to reduce the cost of litigation where the 
end result will simply be reimbursement of damages.278  If continuing 
damages can be avoided in the first place by stopping the use of the 
trade secret at the end of the trial, then that should be a less costly 
outcome on balance.279 
A more complex question is whether permanent injunctions should 
issue where the “secret is out” because the defendant is using the 
information.  If the information is temporary—for example, plans for a 
new product that will be revealed when the product is released—then 
barring use of that information after it becomes public would create 
costs without any commensurate social gain.  However, a “head start” 
injunction might be necessary in order to deter wasteful appropriation 
activities, where it is difficult or impossible to calculate the cost of losing 
the “head start” in the marketplace. 
D.  Enforcement Costs and Detection 
The above discussion bears on external costs such as litigation and 
other enforcement costs and measures to avoid detection that affect the 
economic analysis.  There are three primary concerns with the economic 
justification of trade secret law.  The following will discuss these three 
primary concerns. 
 
denial of that right.”).  This Article does not address whether such a presumption should be 
rebuttable or not, but in special circumstances an injunction might not issue; the UTSA 
provides for a royalty in such cases.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(b) (amended 1985), 14 
U.L.A. 619 (Supp. 2006); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) 
(injunctions must be granted under principles of equity); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 
483, 505 (2001) (“[I]t hardly follows from today’s decision that an injunction . . . must issue.”); 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 502(a)) 
(emphasizing that courts “may” grant injunctions). 
 277. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (allowing for a compulsory license instead of 
an injunction in exceptional circumstances). 
 278. Of course, there are costs to enforce an injunction, and such costs are not small 
where the matter at issue is by definition not public.  However, the broad contempt remedies 
for violation of an injunction may be sufficient to deter such violations in most cases. 
 279. The costs of enforcing a royalty and enforcing an injunction are similar.  Both 
involve determining whether the defendant is still using the information. 
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1.  Little Known Effect on the Arms Race 
The first concern is that a requirement of reasonable precautions 
may reduce incentives to overprotect some amount, but not enough to 
make a difference, especially where detection of misappropriation is 
difficult.280 Competitors will arguably continue to spend money and 
owners will continue to use self-help because the legal remedy is not 
available if detection of expensive surveillance is difficult or impossible.  
Professor Lichtman suggests that the “battleground” simply shifts to 
more expensive means of appropriation, using an example of covering 
the entire construction site in the Christopher case to avoid aerial 
surveillance, followed by thermal satellite imagery by the competitor.281 
Professor Bone supports this argument by providing a detailed game 
theory model that shows that the level of precautions owners will take 
under trade secret law versus the level of precautions they will take 
without trade secret protection is indeterminate.282  His model implies 
that the amount of money owners spend to protect secrets and the 
amount of money that competitors spend to appropriate secrets will 
depend on the type of protection, the marginal effects of spending on 
protection, and the marginal effects of spending on (mis)appropriation.  
As discussed in Professor Lichtman’s example, there may be cases 
where owners will continue to spend money on protection despite the 
possibility of damages recovery, and there may be times when 
competitors continue to spend money on appropriation despite liability 
risk.283 
These are all valid points and should be the subject of empirical 
study.  Even so, the fact that there is some reduction in the incentive to 
overprotect weighs in favor of trade secrets for a variety of reasons. 
First, the fact that there are some circumstances in which 
unnecessary spending on protection and appropriation is achieved may 
be enough to justify trade secret protection.284  Having the option to 
litigate allows owners and competitors to internalize the expected costs 
and benefits in order to make an efficient decision.  Thus, one would 
expect that owners in fields where misappropriation is harder to detect 
will shift spending away from litigation and toward more protection.  
 
 280. Bone, supra note 5, at 277 n.161. 
 281. Lichtman, supra note 202, at 232. 
 282. Bone, supra note 5, at 277–78. 
 283. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 284. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 153, at 764 (potential for breakdown of bargaining 
or underestimation of damages justifies property based protection). 
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This is a better outcome than requiring all owners to spend more on 
protection. 
Second, the escalation concerns do not take into account the 
alternatives that competitors have under trade secret law, namely 
reverse engineering and independent development,285 or even licensing.  
Additional expenditures to appropriate information from a competitor 
may be less costly than the alternatives if the competitor faces no risk of 
damages liability.  Once trade secret law applies, however, the 
competitor faces a risk of both litigation costs and returning any value 
gained from the appropriation.  This additional risk reduces the 
expected benefits from appropriation and makes reverse engineering 
more attractive.286  The end result is that when there are alternatives, 
competitors will have less incentive to spend funds on appropriation, 
which means less expenditure on protection.  Even though this may not 
apply in every case, a world in which appropriators are at risk for legal 
fees should lead to more efficient outcomes, even if that outcome is 
sometimes spending more money on appropriation. 
The above two examples are an extension of the general principle 
that where the parties must internalize the costs and benefits of their 
actions, we expect socially efficient results to occur.  There is no reason 
to believe that trade secret law is any different than well established 
theories of negligence or strict liability and their defenses with respect 
to governing choices. 
2.  Incentives to Litigate 
The second concern is that trade secret law may impose external 
costs associated with an incentive to litigate, especially where the 
“reasonable precautions” requirement is too low.287  Given an increase 
 
 285. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 367–68 (legal reverse engineering creates 
incentive for less spending on protection against theft).  But see Pamela Samuelson & 
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 
(2002) (discussing positive economic effects of attempts to limit reverse engineering). 
 286. Of course, reverse engineering and rediscovery may be duplicative, but there may 
be positive externalities such as innovation due to the independent research.  Additionally, 
the default is that the competitor would either do the research or appropriate the secret; it is 
not as if the owner will simply share the secret (though perhaps it could be licensed).  Thus, 
having competitors expend money on research is no change from the status quo in a non-
trade secret world. 
 287. Bone, supra note 5, at 277 n.161.   “Indeed, the circumstances of trade secret cases 
and the uncertainty of trade secret law create incentives for frivolous litigation designed to 
harass competitors rather than to obtain relief for trade secret misappropriation.”  Id. at 279. 
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in litigation over time,288 this is certainly a fair point.  However, without 
more data, we do not know how much trade secret misappropriation has 
been deterred, how many cases are frivolous or meritorious, or how 
often the misappropriation attempt was efficient given the costs of 
alternatives and likelihood of detection.  Further, this problem might be 
solved by increasing reasonable precaution requirements and enhancing 
fee shifting for baseless litigation, not by abandoning trade secret laws. 
Wasteful litigation incentives may not be the only reason for 
increased litigation, however.  It may be, for example, that a decrease in 
spending on protection causes competitors to underestimate their 
likelihood of detection such that they get caught more often, leading to 
more litigation.  It may also be that detection technology has improved, 
become easier to hide, or become less costly.  Perhaps competitors are 
risk takers, and thus make the attempt despite the expected losses.  
Finally, it may be that courts are undervaluing damages, and thus 
competitors do not actually face the deterrence that the law envisions—
this would hardly be a reason to eliminate the law. 
Additionally, if a party intends to harass a competitor, it will likely 
find ways to do so even if trade secret law did not exist.  For example, it 
might bring breach of contract suits against employees.289  Companies 
might also bring unfair competition claims against competitors.  In other 
words, trade secret law may have only a marginal effect on frivolous and 
costly litigation. 
The question remains whether the need for more empirical 
information is sufficient to render trade secret law void of support.  I 
believe it is not; there are sufficient meritorious lawsuits, as well as a 
sufficient reduction in arms races (such as the Chinese company 
example above) to warrant continued protection for trade secrets while 
further research is underway. 
3.  Litigation and Detection Costs 
The third concern is that the economic analysis does not consider the 
cost of enforcement,290 which might cause owners to spend more on 
 
 288. Id. at 274. 
 289. They might also bring interference with contract claims against ex-employees’ new 
employers.  As previously discussed, this would be difficult to win in the absence of trade 
secret law.  See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 290. Professor Bone states that “[s]ome readers might object that ignoring punitive 
damages here strips trade secret law of some of its deterrent force.  However, the indirect 
cost argument for trade secret law does not purport to turn on the availability of punitive 
damages.”  Bone, supra note 5, at 276 n.158.  Professor Bone seems to make the same 
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protection rather than sue,291 and the fact that competitors will escalate 
spending to avoid detection,292 both of which negate any incentives to 
reduce spending on protection and appropriation.293  In other words, the 
concern is that trade secret law does not deter wasteful spending on 
appropriation, but instead it may encourage even more wasteful 
spending on appropriation, which now includes additional costs to avoid 
detection, and, later at trial, additional costs to determine whether the 
information at issue was really a trade secret and/or misappropriated. 
While it is true that enforcement costs will decrease the amount 
plaintiffs will receive (and thus create an incentive to overprotect rather 
than bring suit), there are a few reasons why enforcement costs do not 
materially change the economic analysis.  First, the competitor will also 
be spending attorneys’ fees, so the incentive to avoid litigation is 
mutual.294  Second, additional damages, such as unjust enrichment 
disgorgement, shift more risk to the competitor and provide the owner 
with more insurance, so the incentive to overprotect is reduced.295  
Third, if the competitor must pay attorneys’ fees when it overspends on 
appropriation (because jurors would find willfulness when the 
defendant spends more on improper means), then the incentive to 
overspend is reduced, decreasing incentives to escalate. 
 
assumption about attorneys’ fees because his example does not include fee shifting.  See id.  
While it may be true that less complete analysis by others does not discuss fee shifting, fees 
are still part of the economic consideration. 
 291. This decision alone is not necessarily inefficient.  Trade secret owners can be 
expected to select the mix of litigation and protection that maximizes wealth conditioned on 
their estimates about what their competitors might be doing. 
 292. From a logical point of view, this argument is tenuous.  It seems odd to think that 
because competitors will spend money to avoid detection, then the alternative should be a 
decrease in trade secret protection.  Perhaps the result should be increased penalties for 
spending money to avoid detection, as that is arguably more efficient than the owner paying 
more to install anti-detection measures because there is no trade secret remedy. 
 293. Bone, supra note 5, at 275. 
 294. Professor Bone argues both that litigation costs deter owners from suing and also 
that trade secret law encourages frivolous litigation.  Id. at 278–79.  While both statements 
may be true, they tend to show that there is an offsetting effect to litigation costs.  As shown 
in the Appendix, litigation costs will actually tend to deter overspending.  The risk of costs 
associated with frivolous charges may cause competitors to stay even further away from acts 
that might be construed as misappropriation. 
 295. Of course, the incentive to file frivolous litigation may be increased, but a party 
filing litigation to harass a competitor is unlikely to consider the likelihood of winning any 
damages prior to doing so.  If this is true, then unjust enrichment would only affect bona fide 
litigants. 
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A similar analysis applies to detection costs.296  It may be true that 
competitors have an incentive to spend more money under a trade 
secret system in order to avoid detection.297  It may also be true that such 
expenditures might increase the avoidance of detection.  However, it 
does not follow that an “arms race” will occur.  First, because the 
competitor has reverse engineering and independent development 
options, expending resources on avoiding detection is not a foregone 
conclusion.  Second, if the owner shifts costs from protection to 
detection, then for the same spending the likelihood of undetected 
activity is reduced, and the likelihood of the owner winning at trial 
increases because juries will infer improper means from the attempted 
avoidance of detection.  Third, if attorneys’ fees are also shifted because 
the increased expenditures by the competitor are viewed as willful 
misappropriation, then the expected benefits to the competitor are 
reduced.  Fourth, while detection of the theft of intangible information 
may be difficult,298 if owners see competitive products by ex-employees 
being quickly developed,299 then they will have a good faith basis to 
instigate litigation; the mere threat of the costs of litigation should 
decrease the incentive to misappropriate.  The result is that the 
incentive for competitors to engage in high spending should be less than 
it would be in the absence of the law.300  In the alternative, if the 
competitor attempts misappropriation anyway, then one might assume 
that the value of the information to the competitor was worth the 
additional costs. 
The common ex-employee scenario best illustrates the point.  The 
cost for an employee to appropriate secret information for competitive 
use is usually low; there is little incentive for overspending on 
appropriation because there is no need—perhaps some attempts to 
 
 296. Professor Bone includes detection costs in enforcement costs.  Bono, supra note 5, 
at 278–79.  I consider detection costs to be part of protection.  First, detection efforts may 
fend off lawsuits—if someone is caught in the act of misappropriation, settlement may be 
more likely.  Second, detection increases the chance of compensation after a loss; this is not 
an enforcement expense but instead an alternative method to avoid the loss.  Professor 
Chiappetta postulates that the existence of trade secret law allows owners to shift what funds 
they spend on protection to detection rather than elimination of risk altogether.  Chiappetta, 
supra note 8, at 111. 
 297. It is not clear that is the case; even without trade secret law, competitors might still 
attempt to avoid detection to limit reputational effects or common law liability. 
 298. See Bone, supra note 5, at 278. 
 299. Id. at 281 (concurring that detection cost is lower for employees). 
 300. The example in the Appendix illustrates this principle.  This analysis will not 
always hold true, of course, but an entire body of law should not be discarded due to 
exceptions. 
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avoid detection, but little more.  However, in the case of employees, the 
potential costs of protecting information can be a drag on efficiency.301  
The best way to reduce this incentive to overprotect302 is to allow for 
collection against the ex-employee (and more important, the ex-
employee’s new employer),303 even if sometimes the ex-employee might 
avoid detection or other damages.  Having the chance to recover losses 
in the future creates an incentive for the owner to avoid inefficient 
precautions. 
Finally, none of the analysis to date has considered the effect of 
threatened misappropriation.304  If a competitor spends money to avoid 
detection and is caught, then the owner can seek an injunction at the 
very least, even if no misappropriation has occurred.  An owner might 
rationally do so if its expectation of future damages is high enough 
based on future efforts by the competitor.  The result, however, is 
wasted appropriation costs and an increase of litigation costs of the 
competitor, which places downward pressure on the incentive to spend 
more money on appropriation and detection avoidance. 
CONCLUSION 
Trade secrets are sure to remain an important part of U.S. law, and 
the discussion in this Article shows that there are three potential 
reasons for their importance; those reasons are not irrational or 
inefficient.  Further work can be done to make the analysis more precise 
as well as to learn more about how trade secrets influence decisions to 
innovate, but the analysis here is a good starting point for better 
understanding how trade secrets affect business expenditures. 
 
 301. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 302. If the company is in an industry where overprotection is too costly in any event, 
then the marginal effect of trade secret law will be greatly reduced.  Even so, having the 
option allows the company to make the most efficient choice of protection. 
 303. But see Bone, supra note 5, at 282–83 (discussing costs of detection relating to ex-
employees).  The prediction that start-up companies will buy information rather than hire ex-
employees to avoid detection (and thus increase anti-detection costs) seems unlikely.  Most 
companies, start-ups especially, tend to value the minds of the employees even if they are 
bringing trade secrets and even more so when the company only has reason to know, but not 
actual knowledge, of wrongdoing by the ex-employee.  See, e.g., Henkel Corp. v. Cox, 386 F. 
Supp. 2d 898, 901, 903–04 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (ex-employee who misappropriated information 
testified that he may or may not have shared that information with others at his new 
employer). 
 304. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619, 633–34 (Supp. 
2006). 
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 APPENDIX:  AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
An example of the analysis in Parts III and IV will help illustrate the 
points made.  Assume that a secret is worth $1000 to a company (O), 
but the same information is worth only $500 if the information were also 
in the hands of a competitor (C).  Presumably, the competitor would 
then have $500 of value in an efficient market,305 assuming the secret is 
the entire value of the business—simplifying assumptions made for the 
sake of example. 
Without more, there is no social gain by protecting the trade secrets.  
The owner may be unhappy, but such is life.  In the optimal world, we 
would want neither party to spend money to protect or to take the 
information, which are inherently wasteful activities.306  Also, we would 
not want the competitor to reverse engineer or perform any research to 
develop the same information unless we knew that the effort would 
advance knowledge beyond the owner’s level of information because 
that expenditure would just shift revenues between the parties without 
the creation of new social benefit.307  Finally, we would expect the 
competitor to independently develop or bargain for use of the secret if 
the competitor valued the information more than the owner. 
Unfortunately, we do not live in the optimal world, and the above 
assumptions do not hold true.  The competitor wants some profits and 
the owner is unwilling to transfer rights to the secret.  Thus, the 
competitor will either appropriate the owner’s information or 
independently develop or reverse engineer it.  Hopefully, these acts 
would create additional social benefit by building on the original 
information.  The competitor thus has choices to make about how much 
to spend to obtain the information, leaving the owner choices about how 
much to spend to protect the information. 
 
 305. Instead of O selling ten units at $100, O would sell five units at $100, and C would 
sell five units at $100. 
 306. Of course, if C could costlessly obtain the information, and O did not spend any 
money on protection, then O might not have the incentive to produce the information in the 
first place.  However, from a marginal point of view, O would be protecting the information 
anyway, and the only question is how much. 
 307. This assumes, again, that the owner is not obtaining monopoly profits or otherwise 
under-producing.  See supra Part III.A. 
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A.  No Trade Secrets 
In the absence of trade secret law, one would expect the competitor 
to spend as much as possible to obtain the secrets, up to a point where it 
is marginally cheaper to independently develop.  In theory, the 
competitor would spend an amount that would maximize his chances of 
success in light of whatever the owner is spending.308  Similarly, the 
owner would spend as much as possible to protect the secrets, up until 
the point where it is marginally less costly309 to lose the secret than to 
protect it.  How much each spends will depend on how much the other 
spends and the likelihood of success depending on cost levels.  This 
leads to three variables: 
• o is the amount the owner spends for protection and detection; 
• c is the amount the competitor spends for appropriation and 
avoiding detection; and 
• p(o,c) is the probability of appropriation based on the amounts 
spent.310 
Complex math could be used if we knew what the function p looked 
like, but in general we do not; here a simple table will suffice for 
illustrative purposes.  The table that follows shows nine states of the 
world, where o is low ($50), medium ($100), and high ($150), and where 
c is low ($50), medium ($100), and high ($150). 
One final introductory point:  in this illustration, I combine the costs 
for detection and protection/appropriation; one would expect that more 
costly means of appropriation include resources allocated to not getting 
caught and that more costly means of protection include better ways of 
detecting misappropriation.  Furthermore, one would expect that 
expenditures on protection include expenditures to avoid accidental 
disclosure.  In each box, I put the following values: 
• P is my assigned probability p(o,c) for a specified value of o and 
c;311 
 
 308. Professor Bone sets up this game theory approach very thoroughly.  Bone, supra 
note 5. 
 309. “Cost” of loss here is an expected value, that is, the probability adjusted loss. 
 310. The competitor does not always know that the information will have a particular 
value.  A more complex model would include a term that incorporates the probability that 
the actual value of the information will be equal to the perceived value.  For the sake of 
simplicity, included in probability p is the probability that the information is “successfully” 
appropriated, meaning that it has the anticipated value. 
 311. p(o,c) is defined such that the probability of appropriation increases as c increases, 
but with diminishing returns.  Similarly, the probability of appropriation decreases as o 
increases, but also with diminishing returns. 
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• OL,M,H is the expected value O gets in low, medium, and high 
states of the world; and 
• CL,M,H is the expected value C gets in low, medium, and high 
states of the world.  
The following formulas define O and C: 
• Ox = V - (P*L) - o, where V is the value (here $1000), and L is 
the Loss (here $500); and 
• Cx = (P*L) - c, where L is the Loss to the owner, but also the 
gain to the competitor (here $500). 
Given the above definitions, the following table describes my 
hypothetical world without trade secrets.312 
 
Table 1 
c 
  $50 $100 $150 
P 0.4 P 0.7 P 0.9 
OL $750 OL $600 OL $500 
$50 
CL $150 CM $250 CH $300 
P 0.2 P 0.5 P 0.7 
OM $800 OM $650 OM $550 
$100 
CL $50 CM $150 CH $200 
P 0.05 P 0.35 P 0.55 
OH $825 OH $675 OH $575 
o 
$150 
CL -$25 CM $75 CH $125 
      
 An examination of this table shows that a Nash Equilibrium is 
reached when both o and c are highest.  O is better off by spending the 
most money for protection no matter what C spends.  C is better off by 
spending the most money for appropriation no matter what O spends.  
Consequently, this example requires no assumptions about whether or 
not O or C knows what the other will be spending. 
Note as well that because O has spent the maximum amount, C does 
not even recoup his costs—C spends $150 for appropriation and can 
only expect $125 in return.  If C is a risk taker or (more likely) values 
 
 312. Note that the non-trade secret world includes contract and tort law, and that is not 
built into this model.  Thus, the assumption here is that the appropriation is either not 
actionable at common law, or is undertaken by someone without privity, such as a recipient of 
information from an internal spy. 
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the information more than O, then C would still be expected to spend 
the most.  In all events, whether C attempts to misappropriate will 
depend on the costs of independent discovery. 
This illustration shows that without trade secret law the likely 
outcome is an over-allocation of resources on protection and 
appropriation. 
B.  Basic Trade Secret Assumptions 
The next table implements some basic trade secret assumptions to 
show how trade secret law affects decision making.  Let us now assume 
that in addition to the probability of appropriation, we also have a 
probability of success in an ensuing lawsuit.  I define the following new 
variable: 
• q(o,c) is the probability of recovery by O for the appropriation, 
meaning O discovers the misappropriation and wins a lawsuit. 
In the next table, therefore, the following example result is added: 
• Q is the assigned probability of recovery q(o,c) for a given level 
of o and c. 
In this example, Q increases as o increases to account for increased 
probability of detection and increased probability of a fact-finder 
finding reasonable precautions and improper means.  Assuming that 
$100 is considered to be the likely “reasonable precautions,” there is a 
large jump in Q when o increases from $50 to $100. 
Similarly, Q decreases as c increases because the likelihood of 
detection decreases.313  However, this decrease is tempered when o is 
high for two reasons.  First, when o is high then the likelihood of 
detection increases.  Second, assuming the competitor’s activities are 
discovered when o is high, the large expenditures on protection and the 
large expenditures on improper means greatly enhance the likelihood 
that a fact-finder will rule in favor of the owner.  These effects wind up 
offsetting each other, except for when o is medium and c is high, in 
which case C has the best chance of avoiding detection. 
The formulas for determining outcome are as follows: 
• Ox = V - (P*L) - o + (P*Q*L); and 
• Cx = (P*L) - c - (P*Q*L). 
 
 313. A more correct and complex example would separate probability of detection from 
probability of success.  However, combining the two into one probability does not affect the 
ability of the example to illustrate the principles so long as the combination takes into 
account the interactive effect of the variables on each other. 
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The owner now has the chance to recover losses, while the 
competitor has the chance of paying damages. 
 
Table 2 
c 
  $50 $100 $150 
P 0.4 P 0.7 P 0.9 
Q 0.3 Q 0.4 Q 0.4 
OL $810 OL $740 OL $680 
$50 
CL $90 CM $110 CH $120 
P 0.2 P 0.5 P 0.7 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.6 
OM $870 OM $850 OM $760 
$100 
CL -$20 CM -$50 CH -$10 
P 0.05 P 0.35 P 0.55 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.8 
OH $843 OH $815 OH $795 
o 
$150 
CL -$43 CM -$65 CH -$95 
      
Here, the competitor has lost almost all incentive to allocate 
resources to appropriation.  Only when the owner spends little on 
precautions would the competitor have a chance at recouping costs, and 
even then only a risk taking competitor (or one who expects loss to be 
undervalued) might consider such an action.314  This table also shows 
that requiring reasonable precautions has the desired effect—O’s 
outcome is maximized spending $100.  While the outcome might be 
indeterminate when C is high, if C knows that O will be spending 
reasonable precautions, then C would never be high. 
C.  Competitor Has a Higher Value 
The above examples assume that the competitor gains the same 
amount that the owner loses.  A more realistic scenario is that the 
competitor values the secret more than the owner will lose.  This is a 
situation in which one might ordinarily want a transfer to occur.  
 
 314. This is not necessarily contrary to the empirical evidence showing large amounts of 
theft.  It may simply be that those who are experiencing theft are under-protecting.  Further, 
if the competitor is caught, it may be that the competitor was a risk taker or misjudged the 
owner’s level of precaution. 
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However, in the absence of bargaining or with high transaction costs, 
the table below shows that under the “basic” trade secret rules the 
expected outcome is higher spending on precautions and appropriation. 
The formulas for O and C are as follows: 
• Ox = V - (P*L) - o + (P*Q*L); and 
• Cx = (P*(L+B)) - c - (P*Q*L), where B equals the additional 
benefit to the competitor by having the information. 
In the example, B is $300, so the Loss to O is $500, but the benefit to C 
is $800. 
Assuming a loss only damages rule, the following table shows the 
outcome. 
 
Table 3 
c 
  $50 $100 $150 
P 0.4 P 0.7 P 0.9 
Q 0.3 Q 0.4 Q 0.4 
OL $810 OL $740 OL $680 
$50 
CL $210 CM $320 CH $390 
P 0.2 P 0.5 P 0.7 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.6 
OM $870 OM $850 OM $760 
$100 
CL $40 CM $100 CH $200 
P 0.05 P 0.35 P 0.55 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.8 
OH $843 OH $815 OH $795 
o 
$150 
CL -$28 CM $40 CH $70 
      
The results are interesting.  First, C will have an incentive to spend a 
high amount no matter what O spends (although O must spend less in 
order for C to make money).  O is a bit more indeterminate.  If O knows 
that C will spend a high amount or is risk averse, then O will spend a 
high amount, and the combined expected value for O and C is lower 
than what O would have if O simply spent $100 on protection and C did 
not attempt to misappropriate.  Otherwise, O might spend less and risk 
a lower benefit.  As Professor Bone predicts, it is unclear whether 
society is better off in this scenario because there is no clear choice for 
either party. 
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D.  Attorneys’ Fees 
The results of the additional benefit to C are tempered somewhat by 
attorneys’ fees.  The table below shows that although fees might offset 
the amount that O might recover in litigation, the fees paid by C 
actually have a much larger effect on C’s behavior than the fees have on 
O’s behavior.  The revised formulas are: 
• Ox = V - (P*L) - o + (P*Q*L) - (P*F), where F is the amount of 
fees for litigation (here assumed to be $200 for both parties); and 
• Cx = (P*(L+B)) - c - (P*Q*L) - (P*F). 
Based on this, the new table is as follows. 
 
Table 4 
c 
  $50 $100 $150 
P 0.4 P 0.7 P 0.9 
Q 0.3 Q 0.4 Q 0.4 
OL $730 OL $600 OL $500 
$50 
CL $130 CM $180 CH $210 
P 0.2 P 0.5 P 0.7 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.6 
OM $830 OM $750 OM $620 
$100 
CL $0 CM $0 CH $60 
P 0.05 P 0.35 P 0.55 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.8 
OH $833 OH $745 OH $685 
o 
$150 
CL  -$38 CM -$30 CH -$40 
      
The results are still indeterminate.  The competitor will want to 
spend a high amount in all states of the world, but can only expect to 
recoup the investment if the owner decides against protection, which is 
unlikely, given that O is maximized when o is either medium or high, 
but not low.  Even with this uncertainty, the risk of attorneys’ fees 
reduces C for all values of c and o, to the point that investing any money 
in appropriation will be unlikely. 
E.  Unjust Enrichment and Fee Shifting 
Finally, the above indeterminate results become determinate by the 
application of unjust enrichment disgorgement and fee shifting.  The 
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following table includes a calculation for both of these remedies 
available under trade secret law, and they yield a clear best case solution 
with the assumptions under this example.  The formulas for each unjust 
enrichment outcome are as follows: 
• Ox = V - (P*L) - o + (P*Q*(L+B)) - (P*F); and 
• Cx = (P*(L+B)) - c - (P*Q*(L+B)) - (P*F). 
This last table includes another column, which assumes that the 
owner can recoup attorneys’ fees from the competitor in cases where 
the competitor has spent the most on appropriation (and thus is 
considered a “willful” misappropriator).  The formulas for this last 
column are: 
• Ox = V - (P*L) - o + (P*Q*(L+B)) - (P*F) + (P*Q*F); and 
• Cx = (P*(L+B)) - c - (P*Q*(L+B)) - (P*F) - (P*Q*F). 
The table below implements all of these assumptions and formulas. 
 
Table 5 
             c fee shift 
 $50 $100 $150 $150 
P 0.4 P 0.7 P 0.9 0.9 
Q 0.3 Q 0.4 Q 0.4 0.4 
OL $766 OL $684 OL $608 $680 
$50 
CL $94 CM $96 CH $102 $30 
P 0.2 P 0.5 P 0.7 0.7 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.6 0.6 
OM $872 OM $870 OM $746 $830 
$100 
CL -$42 CM -$120 CH -$66 -$138 
P 0.05 P 0.35 P 0.55 0.55 
Q 0.7 Q 0.8 Q 0.8 0.8 
OH $843 OH $829 OH $817 $905 
o 
$150 
CL -$48 CM -$114 CH -$172 -$244 
      
It appears that when all remedies are fully developed, the only levels 
of spending that give the competitor a chance to recoup expenditures 
are low and medium.  Further, if the competitor knows the owner will 
spend at least $100 in reasonable precautions (which is its best outcome 
for O when c is low or medium), then C would not even make the 
attempt.  Furthermore, with fee shifting where c is high, the competitor 
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is unlikely to ever spend a high amount, which means that the owner 
will never have an incentive to spend a high amount. 
The above illustration can be further modified to test a variety of 
these assumptions:  what happens if losses are under-valued?  What 
happens if p and q change more or less than assumed at each value of o 
and c?  What happens if the benefit to C exceeds the value to O?  What 
if the parties have differing legal fees?  What if fee shifting is available 
when c is at a medium level? Each of these questions may change the 
analysis, but regardless of such changes, the basic model shows that 
trade secret law tends to push expenditures on protection and 
appropriation downward, and with all remedies attached, many efforts 
to misappropriate trade secrets may not happen at all.  They certainly 
would not be rewarded. 
 
 
